政企关系、官员视察与企业绩效
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| Title | Political Connections、Official Inspection and Firm Performance
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| 作者 | 罗党论 应千伟 吴妍婷 |
| Author | Luo Danglun, Ying Qianwei and Wu yanting |
| 作者单位 | 中山大学岭南（大学）学院 中山大学管理学院 |
| Organization | Lingnan (University) College,Sun Yat-Sen University; School of Business, Sun Yat-Sen University |
| 作者Email | luodl@mail.sysu.edu.cn; yingqianwei@gmail.com; wuyanting@gmail.com |
| 中文关键词 | 品牌 官员视察 政治关系 |
| Key Words | Official Inspection; Political Connections; Firm Performance |
| 内容提要 | 官员视察企业的活动越来越得到企业的重视，正成为建立政企关系的重要活动。本文以2004-2007年上市公司中的制造行业为样本，实证分析了企业特征与官员视察及官员视察与企业绩效之间的关系，结果表明，（1）具有品牌、技术特征及企业规模优势的企业更容易受到官员视察。总的来说，越是知名的企业被官员视察的可能性越大。吸引不同级别的官员视察的企业特征并不一样，其中，国家级官员视察更侧重企业的技术特征，省级官员与省级以下的官员更侧重企业的品牌特征。（2）企业先前的政治关系会让企业更容易得到官员的视察机会。（3）官员视察对企业的绩效有显著的积极影响。在采用倾向得分匹配分析法(PSM)控制了样本选择偏差后，发现有官员视察的企业，其绩效变化显著要好过那些没有被视察的企业，而且视察企业的官员级别越高，对企业的绩效影响越好。这有助于我们进一步理解官员活动对企业资源配置的影响。 |
| Abstract | The official inspections are attracting increasingly focus from the firms, which is becoming an important channel of obtaining political connections. This paper investigates the relationship among firm characteristics, official inspection and firm performance based on the data collected from the listed firms in China between 2004 and 2007. We find that:(1) Firms with renowned band, advanced technology and greater size attract more official inspections. Generally, the probability of official inspection is higher for famous firms, and the firms characteristics varies when attracting official inspections with different levels. In particular, official inspections from central government are focusing more on the technologies, while those from provincial government and below hold preference on band characteristics.(2) Political connections that the firms previously owned would significantly promote the probability of official inspection.(3) Official inspections play an active role on firm performance. After controlling sampling bias through PSM, we find firms with official inspection are encountering better changes on performance, comparing to those without inspections, and the magnitude of this change is enhanced when the official inspections are of higher levels. The conclusion we find is helpful for our understanding of the influence from official inspections to the allocations of resources for firms. |
| 文章编号 | WP29 |
| 登载时间 | 2010-12-21 |
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