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部分交叉所有权、默契合谋与中国进口铁矿石定价权缺失
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TitlePartial Cross Ownership, Tacit Collusion and the Deficiency of Seaborne Iron Ore Pricing Power in China  
作者于左 彭树宏  
AuthorYU Zuo and Peng Shuhong  
作者单位东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,井冈山大学商学院 
OrganizationCenter for Industrial and Business Organization DUFE, China;Business School of Jinggangshan University, China) 
作者Emailyuzuo16@yahoo.cn,shuhong.peng@gmail.com 
中文关键词部分交叉所有权 默契合谋 进口铁矿石定价权 
Key Words Partial Cross Ownership; Tacit Collusion; China Seaborne Iron Ore Pricing Power 
内容提要本文针对中国进口铁矿石定价权缺失问题,构建了企业部分交叉所有权下默契合谋形成机制的理论模型,通过对澳大利亚必和必拓和力拓(“两拓”)的案例讨论,发现了中国进口铁矿石定价权缺失的经济学逻辑,即在国际海运铁矿石与国内钢铁产业市场结构失衡以及国际层面缺乏对(合谋)跨国滥用市场势力有效约束的前提下,两拓之间的部分交叉所有权安排有利于其达成默契合谋;合谋可能性随交叉所有权比例提高而增大;“两拓”合谋也有利于其与巴西淡水河谷达成合谋,“两拓”合谋或其与淡水河谷合谋,实施超高定价是导致中国进口定铁矿石定价权缺失的根本原因;两拓企图合并和设立合资企业是为了实现合谋效应;国际金融巨头对铁矿石等企业的部分交叉所有权安排及其隐蔽的限制竞争行为应当引起反垄断当局重视。 
AbstractIn this paper, focusing on the problems of seaborne iron ore pricing power deficiency in China, we construct a model about the forming mechanism of tacit collusion with the firms having Partial Cross Ownership, and examine the model by the case of BHP Billiton and RioTinto in Australia. We have found the economic logic of the seaborne iron ore pricing power deficiency problems in China, which are the partial cross ownership arrangement between BHP Billiton and RioTinto facilitating their tacit collusion at the circumstance of out-of-balance between world seaborne iron ore industry structure and the china iron steel industry structure, and at the international level there are no restraints to the transnational collective abusing market power behaviors. The tacit collusion probabilities between the partial cross ownership firms increase when the higher ratio of partial cross ownership. The tacit collusion between BHP Billiton and RioTinto also facilitates their tacit collusion with Vale S.A. BHP Billiton and RioTinto or with Vale S.A.’s collusion and overcharge on the seaborne iron ore are the essential reasons of the seaborne iron ore pricing power deficiency in China. The intending merger, production joint venture between BHP Billiton and RioTinto are to facilitate their tacit collusion and acquire the effect of collusion. The Partial Cross Ownership arrangement between the iron ore firms and their secretly competition restricting conducts need the competition authority pay extraordinarily attention. 
文章编号WP70 
登载时间2011-03-30 
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