政治关联与企业契约实施环境的所有制差异
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| Title | Political Connection, Ownership and Firms’ Contract Environment
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| 作者 | 王永进 |
| Author | Wang Yongjin |
| 作者单位 | 厦门大学经济学院国际经济与贸易系 |
| Organization | School of Economics, Xiamen University |
| 作者Email | wyjin17@163.com |
| 中文关键词 | 政治关联 契约实施环境 所有权特征 |
| Key Words | Political Connection; Contract Enforcement Environment; Ownership |
| 内容提要 | 本文基于世界银行的调查数据，对不同所有制企业的契约实施环境进行了比较。研究发现，民营企业的契约实施环境显著低于其他所有制类型的企业，而且在控制了其他企业特征之后，该结论依然成立。在此基础上，我们进一步考察了政治关联对企业契约实施环境的影响。实证结果表明：（1）与政府官员建立政治联系能够显著改善民营企业的契约实施环境，而且这些官员的地位越高，其影响越显著。但其对非民营企业的影响则不明显，甚至符号为负。（2）对所有样本而言，董事会中有政府官员以及总经理被政府任命对企业契约的实施环境虽有一定积极影响，但效果并不显著。 |
| Abstract | Based on 2400 Chinese firms’ data from World Bank’s 2003 survey, this paper investigates the difference of contract enforcement environment between private and non-private firms. The results show that, the contract enforcement environment of private firms is significantly lower than that of the non-private enterprises and this result still hold after controlling for other firm level characters. In addition, by using endogenous switching model and propensity score matching method, we then empirically investigate the effect of political connection on firms’ contract enforcement environment, from which we find that: (1)political connections with “competent officials” and the general manager’s party relation will significantly improve firms’ contract enforcement environment, especially for that private firms. (2) Government official in the board or appointed general manager by the government have negative effect on firms’ contract enforcement environment. |
| 文章编号 | WP75 |
| 登载时间 | 2011-06-01 |
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