政绩诉求、政府控制与边际社会性支出——基于地方国有上市公司的研究
阅读全文
下载全文 |
| Title | Political Achievement Demands, Government Controland Marginal Social Expenditure:
|
| 作者 | 逯东 孙岩 杨丹 杨记军 |
| Author | Lu Dong, Sun Yan, Yang Dang and Yang Jijun |
| 作者单位 | 西南财经大学中国家庭金融调查与研究中心；西南财经大学工商管理学院；西南财经大学国际商学院 |
| Organization | Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | ludong@swufe.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 国有企业 政绩诉求 政府控制 边际社会性支出 |
| Key Words | State-owned Enterprise; Political Achievement Demands; Government Control; Marginal Social Expenditure |
| 内容提要 | 本文根据2004-2009年间所有A股非金融类地方国有企业为样本，实证检验了地方政府的政绩诉求目标如何影响地方政府对国有企业的控制，并继而导致地方国有企业产生边际社会性支出，揭示了“政绩诉求——政府控制——边际社会性支出”这样一条政府干预国有企业而产生经济后果的传导机制。研究发现：⑴当地方政府在面临财政收入不足、国有经济面临的就业压力更大和经济增长缓慢时，地方政府往往会加大对国有企业的控制程度，尤其在面临就业压力时，会倾向于加强对员工规模大的企业的控制；⑵随着地方政府对国有企业控制程度的加强，会导致国有企业发生更多的边际社会性支出，如非效率投资和冗员等；⑶政府控制程度的加强，削弱了高管的薪酬业绩敏感性，一定程度上扭曲了国有企业的薪酬激励机制。 |
| Abstract | Using the data of Chinese local listed SOEs from 2004-2009, this paper investigates how local government political achievement demands affect its control on SOEs, which results in the marginal social expenditure. This research reveals a transmission mechanism named “political achievement demands - government control - the marginal social spending", which shows the way of how local government intervenes economic consequences of SOEs. We find that: ⑴When the local government is lack of revenue and under the pressure of employment and economic growth, it tends to take more control of SOEs. Especially, when faced pressure of employment, local government would tend to strengthen the control of large-scale enterprise; ⑵As the local government take more control of SOEs, local SOEs will produce more marginal social expenditure, such as the inefficiency of investment and the redundancies; ⑶Government control weakens sensitivity of compensation – performance for top management and distorts incentives of compensation in SOEs to some extent. |
| 文章编号 | WP92 |
| 登载时间 | 2011-07-21 |
|