选择语言还是选择行动？——中国货币政策的最优沟通研究
阅读全文
下载全文 |
| Title | Words or Actions?—The optimal monetary policy communication in China
|
| 作者 | 鲁臻 林秉旋 |
| Author | Lu Zhen and Lin Bingxuan |
| 作者单位 | 中南财经政法大学金融学院，美国罗德岛大学商学院 |
| Organization | School of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;College of Business Administration, University of Rhode Island |
| 作者Email | mluzhen@yahoo.com.cn；blin@uri.edu |
| 中文关键词 | 最优沟通 货币政策 有限理性 |
| Key Words | Optimal Communication; Monetary Policy; Bounded Rationality |
| 内容提要 | 本文在一个简单的新凯恩斯模型基础上，引入有限理性，研究货币政策的最优沟通，包括进行沟通的条件与最优沟通信号。我们得到了货币政策什么条件下应选择语言进行沟通，什么条件下应选择行动来干预经济；以及如果选择语言进行沟通，什么是最优的沟通信号。同时，考虑到中国经济的政府主导特点，我们进一步得到中国货币政策进行沟通的条件更容易满足，效果也更显著，从而中国的货币政策更应注重利用沟通来调节经济。在此基础上，我们得到三个假设：供给冲击大时，沟通效果更明显；货币政策行动与沟通语言一致时，沟通效果更明显；通货膨胀大时，沟通效果更明显。最后，我们通过中国金融市场的数据，检验了这些假设，实证结果支持了我们的理论分析。 |
| Abstract | This paper incorporates bounded rationality in a simple New Keynesian model to investigate the optimal communication. The model gives the conditions for central bank communication. It also describes the characteristics of optimal communication signals. Because the China’s economy is government-dominated, we show that conditions for communication are easily satisfied and the effect of the communication is more significant in China, so the central bank of China should pay more attention to communication. Using Chinese data, we empirically show that the effect of monetary policy communication is positively related to the supply shock, the consistency between implementation and communication of monetary policy and the inflation. This result supports our analysis. |
| 文章编号 | WP280 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-06-20 |
|