企业群体性败德行为与管制失效—— 对产品质量安全与监管的制度分析
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| Title | Explosive Enterprise Immoral Acts and Ineffective Government Regulations
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| 作者 | 李新春 陈斌 |
| Author | Li Xinchun and Chen Bin |
| 作者单位 | 中山大学管理学院 |
| Organization | Bussniss School, Sun Yat-Sen University |
| 作者Email | mnslxc@mail.sysu.edu.cn,xiechenbin@gmail.com |
| 中文关键词 | 群体性败德行为 混合寡头竞争模型 政府管制 第三方治理 |
| Key Words | Explosive Immoral Act；Mixed Oligopoly Model；Government Regulation；The Third Sector |
| 内容提要 | 中国企业近年来被媒体曝光的假冒伪劣和质量安全问题呈现群体性爆发的趋势（本文将此现象界定为“企业群体性败德行为”），企业发展中的伦理道德问题成为关注的焦点，在面对几乎成为行业“潜规则”的较大范围的企业群体性败德行为时，政府管制几乎是失效的。对此问题的理论分析至今主要是针对单个企业的道德行为的研究上，这是过于狭窄的视角。本文认为，这类问题不是单个企业行为所能解释的，而是企业行为、市场特征与政府管制之间的一个互动关系。本文首先探讨基于逆向选择、道德扩散以及法不责众行为导致管制失效的企业群体性败德行为特征和产生机理；然后，通过建立在创新和败德行为战略选择的混合寡头竞争模型，分析行业结构、企业行为与政府管制之间的逻辑关系；最后，讨论了模型的政策含义以及对于群体性败德行为的治理问题。由此，给出了转型经济下质量安全问题政府管制失效的制度分析模型，深化了对于群体性败德行为治理的理论和政策分析。 |
| Abstract | In recent years, Chinese enterprises are frequently blamed by producing fake or low-quality goods, according to numerous media exposures. Even worse, whatever the size of the firms, they are herding to the similar ill conduct, resulting in a disaster of product insecurity. This is also an important moral issue on enterprise growth. Facing the explosive immoral act in the whole industry, the government usually enacts weak or powerless rules of regulation, which in turn worsen the problem. This paper, by building upon a mixed oligopoly model, formally analyzes the relationship among the fierce market competition, the explosive immoral act and the inefficient government regulation. In particular, we focus our analysis on the optimal strategy choice of the firms by allowing them to opt for immoral act or innovative technology to cut their production costs. At the end, we characterize the specific condition under which different types of subgame perfect equilibrium (e.g., the explosive immoral act) occurs. |
| 文章编号 | WP396 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-11-20 |
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