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旁观者何以冷漠?价格对第三方惩罚需求影响的一个实验检验
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TitleWhy are Spectators so Indifferent?  
作者范良聪 刘璐 梁捷  
AuthorFan Liangcong, Liu Lu and Liang Jie  
作者单位浙江大学光华法学院,莫纳什大学经济系 
OrganizationGuanghua Law School, Zhejiang University; Colledge of Economics, Zhejiang University; Department of Economics, Monash University 
作者Emailflc1984@163.com,lulumail@vip.qq.com,jie.liang@monash.edu 
中文关键词第三方惩罚 需求定律 社会偏好 真实劳动 实验 
Key Words  Third Party Punishment; The Law of Demand; Social Preference; Real Effort; Experiment 
内容提要研究表明,第三方惩罚对于社会规范的维持而言至关重要。本文首次基于一个真实劳动(real effort)的独裁者博弈实验框架,探讨了由完全利益无关的第三方实施的惩罚背后隐藏着的经济逻辑。我们研究的问题是,惩罚需求是否敏感反应于惩罚价格?我们通过在独裁者做出分配决策之后变动利益无关的第三方面对的惩罚成本检验了这一点。结果发现,即使完全利益无关,第三方也仍然愿意花费成本惩罚潜在规范的违背者。这种惩罚的需求一方面随着价格的上升而下降,另一方面随着惩罚对象违背规范程度的增加而提升。通过引出接受分配者的信念,我们还证明了这两种动机模式的普遍性。我们的结论是,即使利益无关,第三方惩罚背后的动机也是复杂多样的;这种看似纯粹利他的行为背后也有着很强的经济性考虑。这意味着,我们在构建惩罚行为的微观模型进而进行相应的制度设计时必须同时考虑着两个方面。 
AbstractThird party punishment is regarded as an essential to the maintenance of social norms. We examine the economic logic underlying third party punishment in a Dictator Game within a real effort context in which dictator (first party) allocate the outputs of both first party and second party. The question is whether the demand of third party punishment obeys the Law of Demand. We varied the cost of punishment faced by third parties after dictators made their allocation decisions in a series of experiments. The results show that the third parties are willing to use the costly punishment opportunities. Besides, the level of punishment, on the one hand, is significantly negatively related to the level of price, suggesting punishment is an ordinary good, and on the other hand, is also determined by the extent to which the dictator’s distribution of outputs to himself/herself exceeds his/her own output. We further confirm the generality of such relationships by inducing believes of second parties on whether third party would punish dictators in a given price level or not. These results show that, there are two kinds of forces underlying third party punishment, namely, economic force and non-economic force. We should consider them both when we construct the behavioral models of punishment decision. 
文章编号WP416 
登载时间2013-02-04 
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