自主性公司治理有效吗？--基于董事会投资权限设置对投资效率影响的证据
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| Title | Does voluntary corporate governance matter:
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| 作者 | 柳建华 卢锐 魏明海 |
| Author | Liu Jianhua, Lu Rui and Wei Minghai |
| 作者单位 | 中山大学岭南学院;中山大学管理学院 |
| Organization | Lingnan College, Sun Yat-Sen University; School of Manaement, Sun Yat-Sen University |
| 作者Email | liujhua8@mail.sysu.edu.cn；lurui@mail.sysu.edu.cn；wmhmns@mail.sysu.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 自主性公司治理 董事会投资权限 过度投资 投资不足 |
| Key Words | voluntary corporate governance, investment rights settings on the board of directors, over-investment, under-investment |
| 内容提要 | 公司治理机制有强制性和自主性之分，其目的均为降低企业的代理冲突，但自主性公司治理的有效性仍然是一个有待验证的问题。强调赋予公司更多自主权的新《公司法》颁布实施后，证监会发布了《上市公司章程指引》，要求上市公司根据公司实际修订其公司章程条款，这为自主性公司治理有效性问题的研究提供了契机。本文以2006-2008年的沪深股市的A股上市公司为初始样本，实证检验了公司章程中董事会投资权限的设置对企业投资效率的影响。研究表明，自主性的公司治理在一定程度上是有效的。具体而言，降低公司董事会的投资权限可以抑制公司的过度投资倾向，这种抑制作用在国有控股上市公司当中表现更为明显，但过低的投资权限会导致投资不足。进一步对公司设置不同的董事会投资权限的原因后发现，国有控股上市公司当中设置高董事会投资权限更多是为了弥补货币薪酬的不足；而在非国有控股上市公司当中，能否牢固掌握控制权影响着公司章程中董事会投资权限的设置。 |
| Abstract | Corporate governance is classified into voluntary style and mandatory style, both of which aim at reducing the agency conflicts of enterprises. However, the effectiveness of voluntary corporate governance is yet to be verified. China’s newly amended Company Law entitles more autonomous rights on enterprises, which indicates a possibility on the study of the issue. Based on the data about the listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2008, this paper examines the impaction of investment rights settings in the board of directors on efficiency of investment, and the result shows voluntary corporate governance does matter to some extent. Specifically, over-investment is restricted by the reduction on the investment rights of the board of directors, especially in state holding enterprises, and under-investment is caused by the lack of investment rights. A further analysis finds that the high investment rights in state holding enterprises is for the purpose of compensating the inefficiency of monetary rewards, while in non-state holding enterprises, the investment rights settings are decided by the distribution of control rights of the enterprises. |
| 文章编号 | WP486 |
| 登载时间 | 2013-06-07 |
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