股票流动性、股价信息含量与CEO薪酬契约
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| Title | Liquidity, Information Content of Stock Prices and CEO Incentives
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| 作者 | 苏冬蔚 熊家财 |
| Author | Su Dongwei and Xiong Jiacai |
| 作者单位 | 暨南大学经济学院 |
| Organization | Jinan University |
| 作者Email | tdsu@jnu.edu.cn；xiongjc-p@163.com |
| 中文关键词 | 股票流动性 CEO薪酬契约 股价信息含量 市场微观结构 公司金融 |
| Key Words | Stock liquidity; CEO incentives; Information content of share prices; Market microstructure; Corporate finance |
| 内容提要 | 如何建立CEO报酬与公司价值相挂钩的业绩型薪酬契约、提高CEO薪酬业绩敏感性、从而缓解委托代理问题是公司金融领域的基础课题之一。本文首次从市场微观结构的角度，研究我国上市公司股票流动性对CEO薪酬激励的影响，发现CEO薪酬股价敏感性与股票流动性之间呈倒U型关系，而且流动性对CEO薪酬业绩敏感性的影响取决于股价信息含量。本文的研究结果表明，上市公司可以通过提高股票流动性，引导投资者深入挖掘公司层面的特质信息，促使股价信息含量上升，然后向CEO提供高强度的业绩型薪酬并增加股权报酬的比重，将监督经营者的任务委托广大投资者，最终设计出更为合理有效的市场化薪酬契约。 |
| Abstract | Reducing principal-agent problem is an important research question in corporate finance. Prior studies have shown that designing proper CEO incentive contracts and increasing CEO pay-performance sensitivity will help mitigate principal agent problem. This article provides a new perspective based on market microstructure theory and evidence. Using data from publicly listed firms in China, this paper finds that the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and stock liquidity is of U-shape, and that the information content of stock prices plays a key role in determining this relationship. The findings of this paper indicate that to design proper market-based CEO incentives, firms can work on enhancing their stock liquidity. If shares become more liquid, investors will be willing to spend time and resources to gather firm-specific information, which leads to increases in the information content of share prices. As a result, firms can provide high-power CEO incentives by increasing the weight of stock options in CEO compensation, thus delegate the monitoring of CEO performance to investors in the market. |
| 文章编号 | WP523 |
| 登载时间 | 2013-09-13 |
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