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存款保险制度还是央行直接救市?——一个动态博弈的视角
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TitleDeposit Insurance System or the Central Bank’s Bailout?——A Dynamic-Game Perspective  
作者姚东旻 颜建晔 尹烨昇  
AuthorYao Dongmin,Yan Jianye and Yin Yesheng  
作者单位中国人民大学经济学院;对外经济贸易大学金融学院;中国银行湖南省分行 
OrganizationRenmin University of China; University of International Business and Economics;Bank of China 
作者Emailyaodongminn@163.com;yanjianye@gmail.com;690036913qq@163.com。 
中文关键词系统性风险 商业银行内部治理 存款保险制度 
Key Words systemic risk; deposit insurance system; internal governance 
内容提要当发生系统性危机时,一国货币当局是选择央行直接救市这种隐性的全额担保制度还是在事前建立显性的存款保险制度?一直以来,学术界对央行直接救市存在很大质疑,认为其破坏了市场规则,引发了剧烈的道德风险,并导致我国商业银行的内部治理水平较低。改革开放以来,严格的金融管制使得我国面临的金融风险并不严重,因此对存款保险制度的引入仅处于理论探讨阶段。2008年美国次贷危机转化为金融危机,并入侵实体经济之后,银行系统面临的系统性危机才引起我国政府重视。本文从商业银行内部治理水平的视角,通过引入一个商业银行的委托代理模型并加入系统性风险的假设,以探讨隐性全额担保机制与显性存款保险制度的优劣。研究发现:(1)与央行直接救市相比,存款保险制度能够降低央行对商业银行的调控不确定性,且其调控结果可评价;(2)存款保险制度内生化银行提高自身风险的成本,降低了道德风险,即引入存款保险制度后,银行的内部治理水平变高。 
AbstractBeing regarded as a market intervention, the bail-out behavior of the central bank after crisis has been criticized for years. It leads to drastic moral hazard situations and is pointed to be the main reason for the internal governance inefficiency in China's commercial banks. However, under strict regulation, previous financial crisis and post-crisis reactions did not draw enough attention and emphasis in China until the financial crisis in 2008. When the banking system encountered a serious systemic crisis, the Deposit Insurance System (DIS) has received significant attention as an important solution. By employing the principal-agent model, this paper provides a comparison, in the perspective of commercial banks’ internal governance, between an implicit fully secured arrangement and an explicit deposit insurance system. We point out that the DIS has two major advantages over the direct Bail-out system: first, the DIS can reduce the regulatory uncertainty faced by the central bank, and provide a way to evaluate the regulation consequence; second, the DIS can internalize the cost of risk exposure, which reduces the possibility of moral hazard. 
文章编号WP527 
登载时间2013-09-13 
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