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金融压抑和企业名义贷款
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TitleFinancial Repression and Firm Nominal Loans  
作者沈永建 徐巍 蒋德权  
AuthorShen Yongjian, Xu Wei and Jiang Dequan  
作者单位南京财经大学;南京大学;武汉大学经济与管理学院 
OrganizationSchool of Accounting, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics;;School of Management, School of Business, Nanjing University;School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University 
作者EmailYjshen@njue.edu.cn;will-nap@163.com;dqchiang@gmail.com 
中文关键词金融压抑 名义贷款 隐性契约 资本结构 留存贷款 
Key WordsFinancial Repression; Nominal Loans; Implicit Contract; Capital Structure; Retained Loans 
内容提要中国金融体制存在以利率管制和市场准入为特征的金融压抑。在此背景下,银行作为宏观货币政策执行中介,既受到货币政策目标限制,又要实现自身利益最大化,这就使其可能借助于显性贷款契约之外的隐性贷款契约。留存部分企业贷款造成企业名义贷款和实际贷款不符就是银行在执行隐性契约时普遍采用的一种方式。本文发现,货币政策越紧缩,企业贷款被留存的可能性越大;民营企业和对地区贡献较小企业的贷款被留存可能性相对较大。进一步研究发现,若企业贷款被留存,企业会计业绩和市场业绩会下降。本文丰富了宏观政策与微观企业行为的文献,并将之与隐性契约研究文献相联结。本文也加深了对金融压抑背景下银企关系的理解,有利于进一步了解中国企业的资本结构,并能为金融体制改革提供部分实证借鉴。 
AbstractThere is financial repression characterized by interest rate regulation and high market access threshold in Chinese financial system. Under this circumstance, banks, agents of implementing macro monetary policies, may turn to invisible loan contracts in addition to visible ones in order to maximize their own interests. While carrying out the invisible contracts, banks retain part of the loan granted to the borrowers, creating discrepancies which are usually bearded by the borrowers between nominal and actual loans. It is suggested that the more stringent the monetary policy, the bigger the discrepancy, and that non-SOEs and firms with smaller regional contributions tend to bear larger divergence. Further studies point out that a company’s financial performance and the market return of its stock will suffer if it has loans retained by its banker. This paper enriches the literature of firms’ behavior responding to different macro policies, deepens the understandings of the relationship between banks and firms under financial repression, and provides further knowledge of the capital structures of Chinese firms. 
文章编号WP671 
登载时间2014-08-26 
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