地方官员变更与地方债发行
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| Title | Official’s Turnover and Local Government Debt Issue
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| 作者 | 罗党论 佘国满 |
| Author | Luo Danglun and Yu Guoman |
| 作者单位 | 中山大学岭南学院；复旦大学经济学院 |
| Organization | Sun Yat-sen University;FuDan University |
| 作者Email | luodl@mail.sysu.edu.cn； |
| 中文关键词 | 官员变更 政策不确定性 地方债 |
| Key Words | Official Turnovers; Policy Uncertainty; Local Government Debt |
| 内容提要 | 近年来城投债逐渐成为地方政府的主要融资手段之一，引起了中央、投资者对城投债风险的关注。本文考察了地方官员变更对城投债发行概率和发行规模的影响，以及与发债风险和发债成本的关系。通过对2004-2012年我国省本级、地级市发债数据的实证分析，本文发现由官员更替引发的不确定性会显著降低城市的发债概率，并减少发债规模。在此基础上，文章进一步研究了官员变更与发债成本的影响。研究发现书记或市长更替会提高城投债的发债风险，增加发债成本。且当变更引发的不确定性程度更高时，对发债成本的影响更加显著。而当城市面临更高的偿债压力时，官员更替对发债成本的影响更加显著。本文的研究丰富了我们对地方债的理解。 |
| Abstract | Recently the quasi-municipal bond is employed as a main mean of financing in local government, which causes highly concern of central government and investors. This paper investigates the official’s turnover’s influence on probability, scale, risks and costs of issuing local government debt. Through the empirical research from provinces and cities in China from 2004 to 2012, this paper indicates the political uncertainty arouse by official turnovers leads to the lower probability and smaller scale of debt issuing. We further discuss how the official’s turnover affects the issuing costs. According with anticipate, the official’s turnover increases the risks of quasi-municipal bond issuing and requests a risk premium, and this relationship appears to be more significant with higher uncertainty. Besides, the impact of official’s turnover is more pronounced when the cities are exposed to more outstanding debt. Our research enrich the understanding of local government debt. |
| 文章编号 | WP744 |
| 登载时间 | 2014-10-31 |
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