中国式分税制、中央税收征管集权与税收竞争
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| Title | Chinese-style Tax-Sharing System, Tax Collection Centralization and Tax Competition
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| 作者 | 谢贞发 |
| Author | Xie Zhenfa |
| 作者单位 | 厦门大学经济学院 |
| Organization | Department of public economics, School of Economics, Xiamen University, Xiamen |
| 作者Email | xzf@xmu.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 中国式分税制 中央税收征管集权 税收竞争 |
| Key Words | Chinese-style Tax-Sharing System; Tax Collection Centralization; Tax Competition |
| 内容提要 | 文章以企业所得税制改革为研究对象，将中央政府的动态作用纳入中国地区间税收竞争关系的研究中。理论上，文章认为，辖区间税收竞争假说相比“自上而下的标尺竞争”假说更适宜解释中国地区间税收策略互动关系；中国式分税制基本避开了纵向税收竞争问题；共享税制下中央政府有动机提高税收征管集权度来压缩地方政府税收竞争的空间。在实证上，文章采用空间工具变量模型以2002年为界分段估计地区间横向税收竞争关系，并重点检验2002年之后中央税收征管集权对地区间横向税收竞争的影响。实证结果显示：2002年企业所得税制改革显著降低了地区间企业所得税的横向竞争程度；中央税收征管集权提高了实际税率，且中央税收征管集权“中和了”地区间横向税收竞争程度。 |
| Abstract | Focusing on the corporate tax reform in China, the paper puts the dynamic role of the central government into the tax competition between provinces. In theory, the point of views in this paper are, comparing to the hypothesis of "top-down yardstick competition", the hypothesis of tax competition between jurisdictions is more suitable to explain the tax strategic interaction between Chinese regions; Chinese-style tax-sharing system could mainly avoid the vertical tax competition issues; the center government has an incentive to increase the extent of tax collection centralization to compress the space of tax competition between local governments. In the empirical, the paper uses the spacial instrumental variables model to estimate tax competition between provinces before and after 2002, and test the effects of tax collection centralization on tax competition between provinces after 2002. The empirical results show that, the corporate tax reform in 2002 significantly reduced the level of tax competition between regions, tax collection centralization increased the effective tax rate and offseted the level of tax competition between provinces after 2002. |
| 文章编号 | WP766 |
| 登载时间 | 2014-11-25 |
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