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上解与拨付——中央与地方财权事权的最优合约安排
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TitleDelivery and Appropriation  
作者姚东旻 杨光 王麒植 李军林  
AuthorYao Dongmin, Yang Guang, Wang Qizhi and Li Junlin  
作者单位中央财经大学;中国建设银行总行直属国际贸易单证处理中心;中国人民大学经济学院; 
OrganizationCentral University of Finance and Economics; China Construction Bank; Renmin University of China 
作者Emailyaodongminn@163.com;yangguang1990188@ruc.edu.cn;wangqizhi90@126.com;junlin.lee@ruc.edu.cn 
中文关键词中央与地方财政合约 财权事权关系 最优合约设计 
Key WordsFinancial Contracts between Central and Local Governments; Optimal Contract Design; The Relationship of Financial and Administrative Power 
内容提要为了探究中央和地方政府财权、事权关系的演变,本文将其视为一种契约安排,纳入最优合约设计的分析框架。本文研究中央政府作为委托人如何通过合约的设计和调整,避免作为代理人的地方政府的机会主义行为,从而实现中央目标的最大化。本文认为:我国建国后的三次财税制度的大变革都是,中央政府作为合约的设计者考虑到外界条件与自身目标的变化,所选择的最优安排,其本质是内生最优合约的变迁。我们发现,当地方政府努力成本给定,中央政府给予低能力地方政府的财政分权度随着对其重视程度的上升而下降,但给予高能力地方政府的财政分权度则随着对其重视程度的上升而上升。该结论依托财政分权度,从地方能力建设与中央重视程度的角度解释了我国财政体制的三次重大变革。 
AbstractIn order to explore the inner motivation of the evolution of the relationship of financial power and routine power between the central government and local government, we considered the relationship as a kind of contractual relationship and applied it into the analysis framework of contract theory, and studied how the central government as a client avoid the opportunism behavior of agents and realize its own effectiveness maximization through design and adjustment of the contract. The main idea of the article is as follows: any change in the tax system is the optimal arrangement of system designers after considered the changes in external condition and their own goals. The core point of this paper is as follows: given the cost of effort, the central government would give local governments with lower ability less fiscal decentralization degree as he paid more attention to it, but give the local government with higher ability more fiscal decentralization degree as he paid more attention to it. The conclusion well explains the changes of the financial system in our country, and studies of the central and local financial governance relations in the framework of a contract theory. All this provides a new research idea for correlative research. 
文章编号WP933 
登载时间2015-10-23 
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