扭曲、企业家精神与中国经济增长 阅读全文
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Title | Entrepreneur Selection, Rent-seeking and Economic Growth
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作者 | 胡永刚 石崇 |
Author | Hu Yonggang and Shi Chong |
作者单位 | 上海财经大学经济学院 |
Organization | Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
作者Email | yongghu@mail.shufe.edu.cn; chstone@126.com |
中文关键词 | 扭曲 寻租 法治 经济增长 收入不平等 |
Key Words | Distortion; Rent Seeking; Rule of Law; Economic Growth; Income Inequality |
内容提要 | 本文将对私营企业的管制引入包含国企和私企两部门的企业家选择和才能配置模型,研究发现管制和法治通过企业家精神的数量效应和配置效应影响经济增长和收入差距。减少管制促进经济增长但扩大收入差距,加强法治对经济增长的影响呈U型而非正向线性关系。模型的数值模拟显示,给定寻租回报,管制程度下降0.1个单位,中国经济增长率平均上升0.72个百分点。给定扭曲程度,加强法治对中国经济形成的先降后升的U型拐点约在寻租回报为1.6处。 |
Abstract | This paper introduces distortion into a model combing entrepreneur selection and talent allocation, in which state-owned and private enterprises co-exist. Our studies show that government regulation and the rule of law affect economic growth through quantity and allocation effects. Reduction in government regulation speeds up growth but at same time enlarges income gap. Enforcement of rule of law and economic growth exhibit U type relationship instead of linear positive one. The model’s simulations reveal that a reduction of 0.1 unit in government regulation leads to 0.72 percentage point increase in China’s economic growth given return on rent-seeking. Enforcement of rule of law leads to a U type relationship regarding economic growth, the turning point is at about the level of 1.6 for return on rent-seeking. |
文章编号 | WP991 |
登载时间 | 2015-12-15 |
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