控股股东股权质押与上市公司真实活动盈余管理
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| Title | Controlling Shareholder’s Share Pledge and Real-activity Earnings Management of Listed Companies
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| 作者 | 谢德仁 廖珂 |
| Author | Xie Deren and Liao Ke |
| 作者单位 | 清华大学经济管理学院 |
| Organization | Tsinghua University |
| 作者Email | xiedr@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn；liaok.12@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn） |
| 中文关键词 | 股权质押 真实活动盈余管理 市值管理 所有权性质 股权制衡 |
| Key Words | Share Pledge, Real-activity Earnings Management, Market Value Management, Ownership Nature; Control Rights Balance |
| 内容提要 | 本文以2003年至2013年间A股上市公司为研究样本，检验了控股股东股权质押对其公司真实活动盈余管理行为的影响。结果发现，相对于控股股东未进行股权质押的公司而言，存在控股股东股权质押的公司更可能进行向上操纵盈余的真实活动盈余管理；且这一关联在非国有控股公司及内部股权制衡力量较弱的公司中更为明显。本文的发现意味着，进行了股权质押的控股股东为规避控制权转移风险，会要求公司通过盈余管理手段进行市值管理以维持股价。 |
| Abstract | Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2003 and 2013, this paper examines whether controlling shareholders’ share pledge will have impact on firms’ real-activity earnings management. We show that with controlling shareholder’ shares being pledged, firms are more likely to be involved in upward earnings management through real activities. This relation is more pronounced in non-SOE firms and in firms with weaker control rights balance. Our results suggest that, facing with the risk of possible foreclosure which may result in losing control, controlling shareholders with stock pledged might ask firms to do real-activity earnings management to boost share price. |
| 文章编号 | WP1027 |
| 登载时间 | 2016-02-05 |
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