任期阶段与独立董事意见发表
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| Title | Tenure Stages and Independent Directors’ Voting Behavior
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| 作者 | 郑志刚 阚铄 林毅坤 胡波 黄继承 |
| Author | Zheng Zhigang,Kan Shuo,Lin Yikun,Hu Bo and Huang Jicheng |
| 作者单位 | 中国人民大学；北京大学光华管理学院 |
| Organization | RENMIN University of China;Peking University |
| 作者Email | zhengzhigang@ruc.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 任期阶段 独董特征的垂直差异 否定意见 独董任期交错 |
| Key Words | Tenure Stages; the Vertical Divergence of Independent Director Characteristics; Negative Opinion; Staggered Independent Directors System |
| 内容提要 | 按照我国上市公司的相关规定，独立董事在同一公司任职不能超过两个任期。上述任期限制使得独董只有在首个任期才会面临连任问题。而独董如果在首个任期公开对董事会议案提出异议，连任概率将明显下降。上述“逆淘汰”现象的存在使独董有动机为争取连任而尽量避免在首个任期对董事会议案说“不”。利用我国上市公司特有的强制披露独董投票意见的数据，本文发现独董在第二个任期提出否定意见的概率是首个任期的1.41倍。而在那些主要由处于首个任期的独董组成董事会的公司，代理成本将显著更高。本文从而为独董任期阶段特征会影响独董监督职能履行提供了直接的经验证据。本文的政策建议是应该在我国上市公司董事会组织中积极探索和推行独董任期交错制度，使不同独董处于任期的不同阶段，由此降低连任动机对独董监督行为的影响。 |
| Abstract | Independent directors in China’s listed firms are not allowed to serve more than two terms according to the relevant provisions. Only independent directors in their first term will face the reappointment problem. However, the directors who vote against management proposals in their first term are less likely to be reappointed. Such adverse selection phenomena warn the independent directors to avoid saying “No” to the management proposals, especially in their first term. Based on the unique data of voting results in China’s listed firms which are required to disclose, we find the probability of voting against management proposals, when independent directors are in the second term, is 0.41 times higher than in the first term, and the agency costs are higher in the firms whose board is mainly comprised of independent directors in their first term. This paper, therefore, provide empirical evidence that the stage characteristics of tenure will affect independent directors’ supervision behaviors. Our policy suggestion is that the formal system of staggered independent directors should be introduced in China’s listed firms. Such practice would push independent directors stay in their different stages of tenure and thus attenuate the effect of stage characteristics of tenure on independent directors’ supervision behavior. |
| 文章编号 | WP1051 |
| 登载时间 | 2016-04-22 |
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