官员晋升激励是否影响企业薪酬公平？
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| Title | Does Political Promotions Impact Pay Gap?
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| 作者 | 孔高文 黎文靖 胡玉明 孔东民 |
| Author | Kong Gaowen,Li Wenjing,Hu Yuming and Kong Dongmin |
| 作者单位 | 暨南大学管理学院；中南财经政法大学金融学院 |
| Organization | Jinan University; Zhongnan University of Economics and Law) |
| 作者Email | konggaowen@qq.com；tliwenjing@jnu.edu.cn；thuym@jnu.edu.cn；kong@znufe.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 官员晋升 薪酬差距 企业产权 政治关联 政府干预 |
| Key Words | political promotion; pay gap; property rights; political connection; government intervention |
| 内容提要 | 本文考察官员职务变动带来的政治晋升激励对企业薪酬公平的影响，并进一步分析了其内在作用机制。研究发现：第一，在地方官员存在政治晋升激励时，本地区企业的高管与员工之间的薪酬公平程度较高。为了控制潜在的逆向因果关系，我们使用各地区的自然灾害作为政治晋升的工具变量，并发现结论依然成立。第二，晋升激励对企业薪酬制度的影响，主要是通过国有企业、政治关联以及强力的地方政府干预发挥作用。第三，基于人民代表大会作为政治晋升激励指标以及安慰剂检验，均进一步支持了前述论断。整体上，本文结论对深入理解政治晋升内在机制及政治晋升激励下地方政府对企业内部制度的影响提供了清晰的政策参考。 |
| Abstract | Using the dataset of local governmental politician's promotion, we investigate whether political promotion distorts firms' salary equity. We find that pay gap is significantly decreased when local party secretary meets political promotion, and this distort is exists largely in state-owned enterprises, political connected enterprises and areas where local government strongly interposes local economics. Our results are still significantly after using earthquake as an instrument variable to control the potential endogeneity, and robust to alternative measures. Moreover, our results also successfully pass a placebo test. We provide a more deeply understanding to political promotion and the mechanism for that how political regime influences enterprise internal system. |
| 文章编号 | WP1098 |
| 登载时间 | 2016-08-16 |
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