地方政府竞争、转移支付与城乡公共服务差距
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| Title | Local Governments Competition, Transfer Payments and the Gap Between Urban and Rural Public Service
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| 作者 | 缪小林 王婷 高跃光 |
| Author | Miao Xiaolin,Wang ting and Gao Yueguang |
| 作者单位 | 云南财经大学 |
| Organization | Yunnan University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | xlmiao1983@qq.com；110683206@qq.com；loveym0726@126.com |
| 中文关键词 | 地方政府竞争 转移支付 粘蝇纸效应 城乡公共服务差距 |
| Key Words | Local Governments Competiton; Transfer Payments; Flypaper Effect; Gap between Urban and Rural Public Services |
| 内容提要 | 缩小城乡公共服务差距，是统筹城乡协调发展和共享社会改革成果的重要内容。近年来，中央不断加大转移支付补助力度，旨在激励财力薄弱地区政府提升对农业农村的财政支出占比，缩小城乡公共服务差距，推进基本公共服务均等化。但在与中国式分权相伴随的地方政府竞争模式下，财政转移支付是否能够真正实现这一目标？本文基于政府、企业和居民三部门体系，分别在经济增长竞争和居民福利竞争模式下，构建了地方政府效用最大化目标的转移支付影响城乡公共服务差距的依赖模型，并采用Panel Data模型进行实证检验。研究表明：（1）只要存在竞争，地方政府将围绕不同政绩考核下的竞争目标进行城乡公共服务支出偏向，经济增长竞争下生产性公共服务偏向经济效益较高地区，居民福利竞争下除存在上述生产性公共服务偏向外，还存在消费性公共服务偏向居民效益较高地区；（2）在地方政府竞争下，各项财政转移支付将加剧上述城乡公共服务支出偏向，其中：一般性转移支付和税收返还的加剧作用，验证了无条件性转移支付客观存在的“粘蝇纸效应”；而专项转移支付也出现加剧偏向效应，与理论判断不符，但刚好揭示出我国专项转移支付配置中存在地方行为偏好占主导的特点。尽管控制地方政府竞争后能够削弱地方政府城乡公共服务支出偏向，转移支付加剧效应也随之消失。但本文认为，回归我国财政转移支付缩小城乡公共服务差距的根本，是在竞争条件下提升地方政府在农村的竞争利益点，包括提升农村生产性公共服务经济产出效应和消费性公共服务居民福利效应。 |
| Abstract | To narrow the gap between urban and rural public service is the important part of coordinating urban and rural development and sharing the fruits of social reform. In recent years, the central government continue to increase the transfer subsidies for inspiring weak financial areas to boost the proportion of financial expenditure of agriculture and rural areas, narrowing the gap between urban and rural public service, and pushing the equalization of basic public services. But under the local governments competition mode accompanied by the Chinese-style decentralization, whether financial transfer payments truly realize the goal? This paper based on three sector system: government, enterprise and residents, respectively in economic growth competition and residents’welfare competition, built the model which local government on the transfer payment of the maximizing objective impacts the gap between urban and rural public services, also adopt panel data model to conduct an empirical test. It reached the following results: (1) So long as the competition exists, local governments tend to biased urban and rural public services around the competitive goals of different performance evaluation, in the part of economic growth competition that productive public services biased toward highly profitable areas, another part of residents welfare competition not only exists in productive public services above, but also in consuming public services biased toward highly residents’welfare areas; (2) In the local governments competition, every particular ficancial tranfer payments will aggravate biased urban and rural public services above, the aggravate effect of general purpose transfer payment and tax return proved the objective “flypaper effect” of unconditional transfer payments; special transfer payments also refers to biased effect, though inconsistent with theory judgment, but it surely revealed that special transfer payments exist the dominant characteristics of behavior preference in the allocation. In spite of the control of local government competition to weaken the biased urban and rural public services, the transfer payments intensified effects disappeared. But we hold that back to the root of financial tranfer payments to narrow the gap between urban and rural public services is to promote the competitive advange point of the rural under the competition, and contains that to promote the economic output effect of productive public services and residents’walfare effect of comsuming public services in rural. |
| 文章编号 | WP1146 |
| 登载时间 | 2017-01-10 |
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