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中国式“压力型”财政激励与地方政府的“援助之手”——基于取消农业税改革的实证研究
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TitleChinese “Pressure-Type” Fiscal Incentives and Local Governments’ “Helping Hand”  
作者谢贞发 严瑾  
AuthorZhenfa Xie and Jin Yan  
作者单位厦门大学经济学院 
OrganizationSchool of Economics, Xiamen University 
作者Emailxzf@xmu.edu.cn;342003260@qq.com 
中文关键词中国式“压力型”财政激励 取消农业税改革 援助之手 
Key WordsChinese Pressure-Type Fiscal Incentives; Abolition of Agriculture Tax; Helping Hand 
内容提要在经济社会转型期,地方政府面临着“压力型体制”下复杂多样的压力来源,积极汲取财政收入成为地方政府应对压力的主要途经,从而形成典型的中国式“压力型”财政激励。在这一激励下,地方政府存在着两种策略行为:直接向下汲取收入的“攫取之手”和扩大税基的“援助之手”。文章以取消农业税改革作为地方政府财政压力变化的准自然实验,重点考察地方政府应对财政压力变化的“援助之手”,补充了现有“攫取之手”的研究,从而更全面地认识了中国式“压力型”财政激励对地方政府行为的影响。文章研究发现,在同一地级市内,受取消农业税改革影响更大的县,其工业产值实现了更快增长,表明财政压力更大的地方政府有更强动机伸出“援助之手”,即通过发展经济来增加财政收入。从地方政府可控的工具出发,文章发现,放松环境规制是地方政府实现工业产值增长的重要手段,而且它的作用主要体现在已有企业的产值增长上。进一步,相同的中国式“压力型”财政激励对不同年龄的地级市政府官员(包括市委书记和市长)是同样有效的,年轻官员没有显示出更显著的行为差别。 
AbstractLocal governments face complex and diverse pressures from various resources under Chinese pressure system during the period of economic and social transition. Extracting actively fiscal revenues is the main way for local governments to cope with pressures, which forms Chinese “pressure-type” fiscal incentives. With these incentives, local governments have two strategies: one is “grabbing hand” to extract resources from below directly, and the other is “helping hand” to increase tax base by developing economy. Using the nation-wide abolition of agriculture tax in 2005 as the quasi-experiment of fiscal revenue pressures, the paper focuses on local governments’ helping hand to response to the change of local fiscal pressures, which is a complement to the current literatures on “grabbing hand”, and help to understand comprehensively the effect of Chinese pressure-type fiscal incentives on local governments’ behaviors. The empirical results show that a county which suffered more public revenue loss due to the agriculture tax abolition among the same prefecture would have more industries’ outputs, which implies that a county with more fiscal pressure has a stronger motive to develop economy with helping hand. From the perspective of tools controlled by local governments, the paper finds that relaxing environmental regulation is the key tool of local governments to increase the industries’ outputs, and the effect is mainly reflected in the increasing output of existing enterprises. Furthermore, the paper finds that Chinese pressure-type fiscal incentives have the equal effect for local governors (including party secretary and mayor) of prefecture level with different ages, and the young local governors don’t have significant behavioral differences. 
文章编号WP1150 
登载时间2017-01-20 
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