企业家精神的积极与阴暗面：创新还是寻租？——理论与经验证据
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| Title | Innovation or Rent-seeking? Allocation of Entrepreneurial Effort in Chinese Private Firms
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| 作者 | 贺小刚 贾植涵 李新春 邓浩 王博霖 |
| Author | He Xiaogang，Li Xinchun, Jia Zhihan, Deng Hao and Wang Bolin |
| 作者单位 | 上海财经大学；中山大学； |
| Organization | Shanghai University of Finance and Economics；Management School, Sun Yat-sen University |
| 作者Email | hxg@mail.shufe.edu.cn；jiazhihan0518@163.com；sysulxc@163.com；denghao.sufe@foxmail.com； |
| 中文关键词 | 企业家精神配置 财富预期 政治连带 产权保护 |
| Key Words | Allocation of Entrepreneurial Effort; Wealth Prospect; Political Ties; Property Right Protection |
| 内容提要 | 自Baumol(1990)的著名论文探讨了企业家精神的生产性、非生产性及破坏性以来，人们认识到需要正视个体决策行为在社会层面的积极或消极价值。企业家在什么情景下表现为积极的创新价值或朝向负面的寻租行为，这是一个仍旧没有解决的理论问题。本文将企业家的财富预期纳入企业家精神配置的理论模型，并同时考虑到了政治连带、产权保护机制的制约效应。基于中国民营企业家所控制的上市公司的数据，本文得到了以下几个方面的结论：（1）企业家的财富预期显著地影响到其才能配置方向，在财富预期非常看好或者非常看糟的情况下企业家倾向于放弃创新活动，而选择寻租性活动的动机则增强了；（2）政治连带提高了企业家的创新投入，但在财富预期看糟的情景下，政治连带具有虏获效应，而在财富预期看好的情景下则具有一种资源禀赋效应；（3）产权保护机制具有提高企业家从事创新的动力，且它对财富预期及政治连带具有比较显著的调节效应。本文的研究表明，企业家精神配置结果将最终取决于企业家的财富预期状态、政治连带状况及产权保护机制及其相互的交互作用，这在理论上进一步丰富了企业家精神配置的研究成果。 |
| Abstract | Since Baumol (1990) explored the productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship, scholars have recognized that it was necessary to compare the positive or negative effect of entrepreneurial behavior on the social level. It is still an unresolved theoretical problem that under what circumstances entrepreneurs prefer innovation or rent-seeking. In this paper, we establish a model of the allocation of entrepreneurial effort based on his/her wealth prospect; simultaneously we consider the effect of political ties and property right protection and their interaction with wealth prospect on the allocation of entrepreneurial effort. Based on the data of Chinese listed company controlled by the private entrepreneur, we get the following conclusions: (1) Entrepreneur’s wealth prospect significantly affects the allocation of their ability. Under the situation of gain or loss, entrepreneur tends to abandon innovation and choose rent-seeking as the gain increases or loss increases; (2) Political ties prove entrepreneur to innovate and have a capture effect when wealth prospect is in loss frame and an endowment effect in gain frame; (3) Property right protection increases entrepreneur's motivation to innovate and it moderates the wealth prospect and political ties on the allocation of entrepreneurial effort. However, the results of the allocation of entrepreneurial activity will ultimately depend on the interaction of the perceived wealth prospects, political ties and property rights protection. |
| 文章编号 | WP1166 |
| 登载时间 | 2017-03-07 |
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