高管对公司传闻负责吗？——基于高管薪酬与职位的证据
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| Title | Are Executives Responsible for the Company Rumours?——Evidence from Executive Compensation and Position
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| 作者 | 唐雪松 彭情 |
| Author | Tang Xuesong and Peng Qing |
| 作者单位 | 西南财经大学 |
| Organization | School of Accounting, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | tangxs@swufe.edu.cn；pengqing_hi@163.com |
| 中文关键词 | 公司传闻 信息披露 高管薪酬 高管职位 |
| Key Words | With the rapid development of network media, the stock market problem of rumours becomes more serious. As the leading character, how do the listed companies deal with rumours? Are executives responsible for the rumours, and do the governance mechanisms play an effective role? Using the data of listed companies during 2005 to 2014, this study conducts a test to show whether the company rumours have an effect on the executive compensation or Position_N. The study shows that: rumours significantly |
| 内容提要 | 网络媒体迅速发展加大了传闻影响范围和影响程度，使证券市场上的传闻问题变得更加严重。作为传闻主人公的上市公司是如何应对传闻的，高管是否对传闻负责，相关治理机制是否发挥作用？本文以2005-2014年我国上市公司为样本，研究了传闻对公司高管薪酬与职位的影响。研究发现，传闻显著降低了高管涨薪幅度与留任概率，并且该效应在高增长企业中更为明显；进一步区分传闻性质则发现，负面传闻或“无中生有”的虚假传闻对高管涨薪幅度与留任概率的影响更加明显。以上结果表明，上市公司内部治理机制也会通过调整高管薪酬或职位对传闻加以应对。 |
| Abstract | With the rapid development of network media, the stock market problem of rumours becomes more serious. As the leading character, how do the listed companies deal with rumours? Are executives responsible for the rumours, and do the governance mechanisms play an effective role? Using the data of listed companies during 2005 to 2014, this study conducts a test to show whether the company rumours have an effect on the executive compensation or Position_N. The study shows that: rumours significantly reduce the executives’ pay growth and the probability of executives to remain in the Position_N. In further analysis, we find that the link between rumours and the executive pay or Position_N is more pronounced for the high-growth companies. After distinguishing rumours’ nature, we find that executives are mainly responsible for the negative rumours or "out of thin air" false rumours. The results above show that the internal governance mechanisms of listed companies deal with rumours by adjusting the executive compensation or Position_N. |
| 文章编号 | WP1213 |
| 登载时间 | 2017-08-08 |
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