工作论文
当前位置:首页 > 工作论文
续贷限制对微观企业的经济效应研究
阅读全文         下载全文
TitleThe Economic Impact of Rollover Restriction on Micro Corporations  
作者刘海明 曹廷求  
AuthorLiu Haiming and Cao Tingqiu  
作者单位山东财经大学金融学院;山东大学经济学院 
OrganizationSchool of Finance, Shandong University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics, Shandong University 
作者Emailliuhaiming_008@126.com;tqcao@126.com 
中文关键词银行续贷 流动性风险 银行监督 
Key WordsLiu Haiming and Cao Tingqiu 
内容提要近期由于银行抽贷、断贷导致企业陷入资金危局甚至破产的现象不断涌现,成为学界和监管部门关注的重要问题。为了解决这一问题,相关部门出台了一系列文件要求银行放松续贷标准,减少抽贷和断贷。那么,银行续贷标准的改变会对企业产生什么样的影响?本文以2007年监管改革为例探讨续贷标准的收紧或者续贷限制对微观企业的影响。结果发现,续贷限制具有流动性风险效应和监督效应。流动性风险效应体现在续贷限制减少了企业贷款尤其是短期贷款水平、降低了营运资本。监督效应体现在续贷限制提高了信贷资源流向优质企业的倾向,减少了控股股东的掏空行为,提高了投资效率。总体而言,续贷限制产生了正面效果、提高了公司绩效。进一步地,续贷限制的正面效应对于非国有、小规模企业更强。最后,续贷限制抑制了短贷长投以及针对僵尸企业的借贷行为。本文的结果表明,盲目放松续贷标准可能会扰乱银行本有的监督功能、降低资源配置效率,不利于后续的结构转型和优化升级。 
AbstractRecently firms often face funding difficulties or even go bankrupt due to banks’ loans withdrawal or rollover stop, making it a focus for academics as well as supervisory agency. To solve this problem, the authorities have introduced several policies that require banks to lessen their lending standards and cut down their loans withdrawal or rollover stop. So what influence will the change of rollover standards exert on firms? This paper investigates the effect of rollover standards constraint or rollover restriction on firm performance by using 2007 regulatory change. Results show that rollover restriction has liquidity risk effect and monitoring effect. Liquidity risk effect is reflected by the results that rollover restriction makes firms cut down their loans, especially short-term loans and leads to less working capital. Monitoring effect is reflected by the results that rollover restriction make loans more likely to flow to good firms, cuts down expropriation of controlling shareholders and enhances firms’ investment efficiency. On the whole, rollover restriction has positive effect and improves firm performance. Moreover, the positive effect of rollover restriction is pronounced in small firms and non-SOE firms. Finally, rollover restriction can restrain short lending for long investment and zombie lending. Our results indicate that lessening rollover standards at will can possibly disrupt banks’ inborn monitoring capacity and reduce loans allocation efficiency, and it will do harm to structure transition and industry upgrade. 
文章编号WP1250 
登载时间2017-12-22 
  • 主管单位:中国社会科学院     主办单位:中国社会科学院经济研究所
  • 经济研究杂志社版权所有 未经允许 不得转载     京ICP备10211437号
  • 本网所登载文章仅代表作者观点 不代表本网观点或意见 常年法律顾问:陆康(重光律师事务所)
  • 国际标准刊号 ISSN 0577-9154      国内统一刊号 CN11-1081/F       国内邮发代号 2-251        国外代号 M16
  • 地址:北京市西城区阜外月坛北小街2号   100836
  • 电话/传真:010-68034153
  • 本刊微信公众号:erj_weixin