经理人相对绩效评价与企业并购行为研究:理论与实证 阅读全文
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Title | Relative Performance Evaluation and Mergers and Acquisitions: Theory and Empirical Evidence
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作者 | 李广众 李杰 朱佳青 李新春 |
Author | Li Guangzhong, Li Jie, Zhu Jiaqing and Li Xinchuna |
作者单位 | 中山大学管理学院;暨南大学产业经济研究院 |
Organization | Business School, Sun Yat-Sen University; Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University |
作者Email | liguangzhong@mail.sysu.edu.cn;eflijie@jnu.edu.cn; zhujq5@mail2.sysu.edu.cn;mnslxc@mail.sysu.edu.cn |
中文关键词 | 经理人薪酬契约 相对绩效评价 企业并购 公司治理 |
Key Words | Executive compensation; Relative performance evaluation; Merger and acquisitions; Corporate governance |
内容提要 | 本文通过构建寡头市场竞争模型对相对绩效评价机制(Relative Performance Evaluation,简称RPE)如何影响企业并购行为进行了理论分析。结果表明,在其他条件不变的情况下,RPE薪酬机制实施与RPE强度的增加将抑制具有协同效应的并购行为的发生。市场竞争程度的上升可以减弱这种负面作用。在实证研究中,本文利用国务院国有资产监督管理委员会2006年与2008年发布的中央企业绩效评价管理改革作为企业实施相对绩效评价的外生事件,对RPE薪酬机制影响企业并购行为的效果进行双重差分估计。与理论模型一致,实证研究发现RPE薪酬机制的采用抑制了国有企业并购行为的发生。行业竞争程度的上升可以减弱这种负面作用。研究还发现基于股权激励的公司治理手段有助于缓解RPE薪酬机制对并购的抑制作用。本文研究为当前国有企业经理人市场化薪酬机制设计及其经济后果提供了理论分析与经验证据。 |
Abstract | We develop an oligopolistic model to investigate the impact of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that ceteris paribus, strengthening RPE lowers the probability of corporate M&As, but an increase in market competitiveness will attenuate this effect. Moreover, the Difference-in-Difference estimation results show that the executive compensation reforms of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 2006 and 2008, which emphasize the importance of RPE, lower the probability of conducting M&A activities for SOEs. Market competition will attenuate the negative effect of RPE on M&A activities for SOEs. We also find that the introduction of option-based executive compensation reduces the negative effect of RPE on corporate M&As. Our research has important implications for the potential economic consequences of RPE adoption in the executive compensation design in Chinese state-owned enterprises. |
文章编号 | WP1346 |
登载时间 | 2019-03-18 |
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