Abstract:The macro fiscal policy is a kind of public goods,which should increase the social welfare while realize the government benefit.Facing deflation,the government will continue on the expanding macro policy dominated by fiscal policy. Within the limited fiscal expenditure,it should choose the measures which enable making the investment multiplier larger and rising the efficiency of the markets.It should also consider the adjustment of taxation structure,the change in the taxation mechanism which imposes a heavy tax on investment,the gradual transformation production typed value added tax into income typed one or consumption typed one.Parallel to lower tax burden on domestic firms to the level on foreign ones,the government may rise the profit expectation,increase the economic efficiency of the society and reduce the capital flow out while eliminate the discrimination of taxation.When dealing with the public debt,the government should pay attention to the transactions and circulation of the bond in order to develop the financial markets in China,make them work efficiently,and transform the public utilities into business firms,as well as issuing and using the bond.Overall,the forms of resources allocation should be transformed from domination by government to domination by market,from centralization to decentralization Generally speaking,during the process of economic transition,a fiscal policy should be combined with the market oriented reform,a short term policy operation should be combined with a long term institutional adjustment.An interaction between the policies and the institutions should be realized.

Abstract:This paper exhibits some empirical results for distribution of wealth among Chinese urban and township households based on the survey data in 1995,It also includes measures of inequality of wealth distribution,estimates of determinants of wealth accumulation and international comparison of wealth distribution in China with other countries.Comparing with some industrialized countries,the inequality of wealth distribution among Chinese urban and township households is narrower,but it tends to be increasingly growing in the future.Widening wealth inequality is not solely resulting from the marketisation of the Chinese economy. Some sources of wealth inequality come from the traditional planned economy such as public housing allocation.This paper presents two interesting findings.One is that there are two peaks in wealth accumulation of household heads,which is different from what the orthodox life cycle theory predicts.The another is that there is the relatively strong correlation between households wealth and households income.

Abstract:This paper adopts an individual cost benefit analytical method and basic ideas of the Game theory in order to analyze some characteristics of Chinese gradual institutional changes,especially the important roles played by local governments.We focus our research on,during Chinas transition to a market oriented economy,the trilateral game process among central rulers,subnational governors and microeconomic entities,and on its economic results.We try to prove that the comparatively smooth progress of Chinas gradual reform and Chinas rapid market oriented transition at lower friction costs are secured by the subnational governments involved,and this renders Chinas institutional changes to take a stepwise path.

Abstract:The problem of incentives for top management has been focus of every one since the reform and opening up in China.This paper mainly investigates the relationship between corporate performance and incentives for top management based on empirical evidence of Chinese listed companies.The findings show that annual pecuniary compensation of top management is rather low;the system of remuneration is unreasonable, and the form is monotonic.Moreover,there is obvious difference in compensation levels across industries.In addition,the phenomenon of “Zero Pay”to top management is grave.We also find that the amount of shares allocated to top management is insignificant,and “Zero Share”is fairly general.The findings of regression demonstrates that there is no significant positive relationship between annual compensation and corporate performance.The shares allocated to top management does not produce the expected incentive effect.It is only an arrangement of welfare system.We also find that no“interzone effect”exits between the amount of shares allocated to top management and corporate performance.Whereas,there is significant positive correlation between the compensation level and corporate size,and negative correlation between the compensation level and the amount of shares held by top management,and the prosperity of industry affects the compensation level of top management.