Abstract:The Concept of “New Economy” first emerged in USA,and then disseminated and applied rapidly and widely across the world.The term of “New Economy” appears also more and more in China.This article holds an inquiry into the meaning of “New Economy” after authers visit to USA. This article is composed of three parts:the first part inquires into the macrobackground when the concept of “New Economy” was set out in USA; the second part probes into the different understanding and views on “New Economy” held in various lines;and the third part studies what is the “New” essence in “New Economy” with the present IT revolution as its principal trend.

Abstract:In this paper,we develop an analytical framework of the restructure of the property rights of Sunan township enterprisesTEs,among which the most form is to transfer the ownership of TEs from the collective to the managers,from the perspective of induced institution changes on the basis of field studies,Based on the framework,we analyze the condition of the transference of TEs,and gain a Pareto Optimal Transferring interval POTI,in which transference means a Pareto improvement for the participants.Then we through a comparative static analysis examine the effect of any changes of the relevant factors on POTI,through a comparative static analysis and give the explanations of some actual phenomena.Moreover,we discuss the zero asset problemZAP,and the result given in this paper is that transferring the ownership of a zero asset enterprise from the collective to the manager at a positive,zero or negative price is conditionally reasonable.Finally,we present the policy implications of the results of the paper.

Abstract:This study examines the impact of ownership structure on the relative performance of listed firms in China.After controlling factors such as industry,firm size and macroeconomic conditions,using data from three industries,namely electronics,commerce and utilities,our regression analysis and hypothesis testing reveal that legal person shares and trading shares have positive effects on firm performance while state ownership has a negative impact.However,this is true only in the competitive electronics industry,and does not hold in less competitive commerce and utility industries.The policy implication of those research findings is that,in order to improve corporate governance of SOEs,pluralization of ownership through listing on stock markets is definitely a right way to go.However,to make this approach effective,a highly competitive environment for those SOEs needs to be created in the first place.

Abstract:In this paper,firstly,we represent the international market share rivalry by Cournot duopoly model with linear demand system and CRS technology.We show that,if the ownership and management of the domestic firm separates,then the owner always has incentive to manipulate his or her managers incentive,regardless weather the ownership and management of the foreign firm separates or not.In particular,if domestic firms owner chooses his or her managers incentive only,this kind of manipulation can make the domestic firm producing Stackelberg leader quantity a credible commitment.The role that it plays here is the same as that of export subsidy in strategic trade policy models.However,the more interesting fact here is that private firm substitutes for government.In the case of bilateral choices of incentives,two firms involve in a “Prisoners Dilemma”. Only resorting to domestic governments intervention can the domestic firm regain the Stackelberg leadership.However,comparing to the conventional leader follower quantity game,the leadership here is too weak.Secondly,we prove that under relevant conditions,the optimal managerial incentives set by the owners depend on the type of competition i.e.quantity competition or price competition only.They do not depend on the type of products i.e.substitutes or complements.