Abstract:To analyze and explain the deficit rate and debt rate and their boundaries in Chinas current development stage is the main subject of this paper.Around this subject,the author first analyzed the real reference meaning of the gauges of “deficit debt”mentioned by the Maastricht Treaty and then brought up a viewpoint of using them for reference but being unable to transcribe them into the practice.Then the author expounded the debt deficit models under“three sectors” economic condition,and based on these the author analyzed and illuminated the equilibrium deficit rate and equilibrium debt rate and dynamic ones.Finally,the author depending on the debt deficit model and using the experiences of European Union for reference to analyze and post the deficit rate and debt rate and their boundaries that are adaptable to Chinas current national economic development stage.

Abstract:The explanatory ability of existed three generation models of financial crisis is insufficient at micro fundamentalslevel with the support of soft budget constraintsSBCtheory,Dewatipont Maskin model shows that SBC will result in credit expansion distortion,SBC theory can also set the Flood Garber financial crisis model in more reliable micro fundamentals.Budget solidification is to be achieved through the alleviation of policy burdens,the attenuation of implicit governmental guarantee and the inducement of competition to local financial system. by Logistic Regression is more precise in predicting fumancial distress with lowest error.

Abstract:Why do governments choose to dump state enterprises by privatization or liquidationExisting research on privatization has not paid much attention to this question.This paper focuses on testing two alternative theories of the issue. One theory explains that governments privatize or liquidate state enterprise in order to enhance efficiency.The other theory explains that increasing government revenue or stopping subsidies to profit losing state enterprises is the motivation.Based on a data set our tests revealed why China rejects the efficiency theory and supports the revenue theory.In addition,we find evidence that the concerns of Chinese government for both unemployment and political benefit of control are important obstacles to privatization or liquidation decisions.A simple implication is that it might be sensible to propose second best privatization or liquidation programs which take government objectives into account and are feasible rather than first best programs which will not be implemented.

Abstract:In this paper,the hypothesis of dual games is at first put forward.Based on the basic characteristics of dual relationship between managers in the stated owned enterprisesSOE and the enterprises organizations,the managers and the administrative organizations,of which relationship between managers in SOE and the enterprises organization is defined as one times game,while the relationship between managers in SOE and the administrative organization as repeated game.And then,the hypothesis takes a test through the investigated data.Finally,some suggestions with regard to the improvement of incentive institutions of managers are given on the basis of analyses of the dual games effect on the behaviors of managers in SOEs.