Abstract:This paper is to give an explanation of the officials corruption in the transition based on the fundamental principles of information economics at a new angle of view.First of all,it proves with a model that there is a possibility to achieve the honesty and efficiency simultaneously in the bureaucratic group under the perfect information;Secondly,it points out that in the control economy and under the imperfect information if the governor wants to create incentive for the officials,must use the privilege as a means at the expense of the efficiency,and this is just the main potential factors which give rise to the corruption during the transition.Finally,it is shown that the corruption stems mainly from two causes during the institutional change sponsored by the governor,one is the need of the governor to keep the efficiency in the bureaucratic group,the another is the difference between the governor and entrepreneur in respect of their capability to get information and create incentive.The former has a negative effect,and the latter—positive effect.The ultimate result of the institutional change is the consistency of the size of bureaucratic group with the information level held by the governor,and only in such circumstances economic efficiency and the social justice could be realized.

Abstract:This paper studies the factors that affect the technological efficiency of Chinese industrial firms by using the data of the Third National Industrial Census conducted in 1995.The main conclusions are:Non state owned enterprises are more efficient technologically than SOEs;the spillover effect of FDI is not significant,if not negative,for a specific industry,but is very significant for a specific province;R&D expenditure spent by provincial public research institutes has no,if not negative,effect on a firms technological efficiency,but R&D expenditure spent by firms significantly improves the technological efficiency of firms in a specific province;regional differences also plays an important role in accounting for the difference in technological efficiency.

Abstract:This paper invests testable restrictions on the time series behavior of consumption and asset returns implied by a representative agent model with the social status in which intertemporal preference is represented by a utility function that generalizes conventional, time additive and expected utility. In the recursive structure of preference, we examine the implication for consumption, portfolio holdings, stock market prices, and the growth of consumption and wealth when investors accumulate wealth not only for consumption but also for wealthinduced social status. Because the elasticity of substitution and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are indenpendent and the social status is introduced, the equity premium puzzle can be reassessed from the perspective of unexpected utility model with the social status.

Abstract:This paper theoretically analyzes the impact of asset pricing bubble on economy by overlapping generation model with technological progress and uncertain return on investment in real capital,and empirically studies the dynamic efficiency of Chinese economy in the transition.Firstly,The proper bubbles in the stock marketif existmay enhance dynamic efficiency and increase consumption per capita when return on investment in real capital is determinable.The impact of bubbles on economy is uncertain when the return is stochastic.Secondly,We show that Chinese economy is turning to dynamic efficiency from dynamic inefficiency.Hence,The suitable bubbles in stock market are beneficial to economy in China if the return on investment in real capital is certain,and it is vital to enhance optimistic confidence of investors about the future return on investment in real capital if the return is stochastic.