Abstract:The policies of granting autonomy and sharing profit in the reform of China were usually considered as a kind of transformation that is not concerning the property rights and ownership. However, those policies have involved various changes of property right arrangements of public sector. The reform of granting autonomy and sharing profit has made the government finance fading out of funds providing for state owned enterprises and freed from the liability of SOEs deficit since 1980s. In the other hand, however, those policies have failed to get the institutional arrangements of SOEs efficient, because they were confined to the economic aspects of SOE and unable to extend to the administrative aspects of the institution. This is resulted from the dominance of administrative powers over China institutional change. It is necessary to restrict administrative powers, control governmental behavior and transform the administrative aspect of SOEs institution,otherwise it will be impossible to get the property rights arrangement of SOEs efficient.

Abstract:On the basis of the assumption of cost leadership of tax collection , the paper discusses optimization of Chinas tax organization structure and analyzes whether Chinas state tax bureau and local tax bureau will be unitized , which is widely discussed . By exploring performance of Chinas tax organization the paper shows that Chinas cost of tax collection appears in parabola and concludes that it is impossible that Chinas two tax organizations will be unitized . Finally the paper gives some suggestions about how to optimize Chinas tax organization structure.

Abstract:The capital stock has been doubled since the economic reform, and the a.p.r. is 7 36. There are two different stages of capital formation. The Increment Reform improved the allocation efficiency and the capital-output ratio decreased before 1994. However, the economic growth is more and more depending on the capital deepening process and the ratio has increased recently. A supply-demand decision framework is afforded to describe the capital adjustment during Chinas transition. By empirical results, the demand-oriented capital adjustment mechanism and the investment behavior have appeared in China. The output and the capital cost are the main factors to determine the capital adjustment and the investment demand.

Abstract:At different time and different places, the repayment rates of group-lending are so different, yet current theories havent given us a convincible explanation. We hold that the output-distribution among group members is an important factor that causes these differences. Our idea has been verified in a repayment game between five borrowers. On the condition of his capability of repayment, the successful borrowers choice depends on whether the credit market is perfect and his evaluations on the future access to credit and the social sanctions. Whats more, this paper has thrown a new light on the factors that have influence on the repayment rate.

Abstract:We discuss the game about disclosure of information between listed firms on the China stock markets and financial intermediaries,and show that the event of false information revelation is a function of monitor probability,power of penalty,and qualification for refinancing determined by the state committee of security regulation.As a Nash equilibrium,false information revelation will occur on the neighborhood of the qualification such as ROE should be 6%.Given the Normal distribution of listed firm quality,if the state committee of security regulation set the qualification for refinancing near the mean of the firm quality,then the frequency of false information revelation might rather be raised.

Abstract:This paper studies the relationships between the largest shareholders and the effectiveness of corporate governance. For 508 listed firms over the 1997-2000 period in China, we find that firms under the control of the government shareholder have lower value, poorer firm performance and weaker governance than the comparable firms under the control of a non-government shareholder; the change of the controlling shareholders is propitious to the improvement of governance effectiveness, scale economics and more professional management. The results suggest that the decreasing of state shares and the increasing control markets are playing an important role in improving firm reforms and corporate governance.

Abstract:This paper utilizes high-frequency data to estimate the realized volatility in Chinese stock market.We found that the microstructure bias of single stock is opposite to that of stock index.By employing data with very high-frequency,the realized volatility of single stock would be much higher,whereas that of stock index would be much lower.Based on the realized volatilities estimated with different frequencies,we develop a more accurate estimate method,which effectively balances the microstructure error and usual estimate error.With the realized volatility,we investigate some style facts of the volatility for stock indexes,such as the leverage effect and the long memory effect.

Abstract:The market liquidity of contracting and operating right to rural land MLCORRL dependents on the effective rural land demand and supply.The impact of relative factors,such as land production price,non-productive return,productive cost,non-productive cost,land price,transaction cost and land scale on rural land supply and demand were analyzed by decision model in MLCORRL,The conclusions followed:land demand exceeded the land supply as a whole and the market is faced the constraint of rural land demand,improvement on the external condition of the MLCORRL should be made to promot-the effective rural land supply.