Abstrat:There are four empirical methods which have been applied to evaluate the capital mobility in developing countries. These include measures of the magnitude of gross capital flows, Edwards model, saving-investment correlations, and the scope for sterilization of the effects of reserve movements on the domestic money supply. This article doesnt only apply the first three tests to assess the degree of capital mobility in China, but also apply the first two methods to make a comparison of capital mobility between China and the other newly industrializing countriesNICs in Asia, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The evidence suggests that all of the NICs in Asia can be considered financially open. The result also suggests that the capital mobility in China is the lowest among the NICs in Asia. Lastly we evaluate the capital mobility in China with Kalman filter. But there is no evidence that the stricter capital mobility regulation in china have taken have more effects after the Asia Crisis in 1997. We also find capital mobility is lower in China than that in the other NICs in Asia which influenced very much in the Asia Crisis before 1997. We draw a conclusion that the step by step measure rather than the jacobinical step is the most suitable policy for the openness of capital market in developing countries.

Abstrat:This paper modifies the traditional cash-in-advance CIA constraint in the following two ways. First, it allows only a fraction of the capital goods and consumption goods to be subject to the CIA constraint. The fraction is assumed to depend on institutional shocks, i.e., the changes of monetization and credit-enhancing transaction. Second, it allows the transaction frequency of money is influenced by inflation. Thus we can study the effects of real and nominal shocks on velocity and output in a general equilibrium framework closed to Chinas realities. When investment and output changes are considered in the theoretical model, monetization and credit-enhancing transaction have no determinate impacts on money and velocity, and inflation will not necessarily lead to lower investment or money demand. The results are different from those of partial equilibrium analysis or traditional CIA models. The empirical results validate the above theoretical predictions. Though lower inflation will reduce velocity, monetization will not reduce it significantly. Hence, the decline of velocity should not be explained solely by monetization and institutional changes hypothesis.

Abstrat:This paper constructed a money demand function based on the cash-in-advance model. In this setting, we infer the equatons of seigniorage-maximizing inflation rate and seigniorage-maximizing growth rate of money under the premise that government earn revenue through seigniorage-maximizing subjecting to the money demand function. We estimate the function according to the year data of China from 1952 to 2004. The result suggests that in order to maximize the seigniorage-revenue and avoid super-inflation, The money authority should control the growth rate of money under 22—24% and control the inflation rate under 11—14%.

Abstrat:In the process of Chinas industrialization from 1949 to 2005, the relation between Chinas light industry and heavy industry had experienced three major transformations. During 1949—1978, the period of pursuing strong capacities, China had been putting emphasis on heavy industry and ignoring light industry; During the period of wealth-seeking, from 1979—1997, agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry were emphasized equally. During 1998—2005, China entered a period of seeking new road of industrialization. During this period, the government and enterprises are seeking new growth points for Chinas economy through structure adjustments, in order to achieve rapid development. By analysis of the three periods of Chinas industrialization, this paper believes that there are five mistakes about the “light and heavy” of Chinas industry should be corrected.

Abstrat:This paper evaluates the technology choice of Chinas industries from 1985 to 2003, computes Chinas industries technical progress TFP. Based on theoretical analysis on the relationship between technology choice and technical progress, the paper, using industries panel data, makes positive tests. Major findings and conclusions include:1 There were two periods of industrial heavilization and chemicalization in 1991—1995 and 1999—2003, and accelerated capital-deepening in 1993—1998 and decelerated after 1999;2 Industries saw technical progress in 1990—1993 and 1999—2003, in which period the progress owed to technical efficiency and technical change respectively;3 Generally, industries with a high proportion of monopoly or SOEs have outstanding technical progress while weak performance in technical efficiency, and industries with intense competition are on the contrary;4In Chinas industries, there are not cointergration between technology choicecapital deepening and technical progress or technical efficiency, which means, though capital Granger causes technical change positivelynot vice versa, the effect is trivial.

Abstrat:The theories of institutional evolution considered institutional vicissitudes as the process of learning and self-adapting to environment. Under the condition of sufficient information and lack of explicit constraint, institution will converge to its optimal path in some way. However, insufficient information, institutional compatibility of real economy, the constraints of property right and institutional efficiency facing by transformation economy will change the paths and results of institutional convergence. With the analyzing frame of Barro 1991 and Skott1999, the paper insights into the long-term equilibrium path of institutional evolution under some constraints and draw a brand-new outline of institutional evolution in the way of evolutionary equation. At the same time, with a group of macroeconomic data, the paper proves the analyzing ability of this model.

Abstrat:Various studies focus on technology spill-over effect of FDI in China, and neglect the influence of geographical factor and enterprise behavior. Based on Wang and Blomstroms endogenic theory model, this paper induces geographical factor and makes further study on spillovers from FDI, including both technology transfer behaviors of Foreign Direct Investment and technology learning behaviors of domestic enterprises.

Abstrat:A widely spread phenomenon in China is that firms seem to lack incentives to build reputation. In this paper we build a repeated game model to analyze the economic and institutional factors behind this phenomenon. The existing literature mainly focuses on the most efficient equilibrium in repeated games. We think that the right approach to study reputation issues in China is to focus on the least, not the most, efficient equilibrium, and analyze factors affect the equilibrium moves from the low efficient to high efficient state. In our model, in equilibrium firm reputation is a dynamic process. Under certain conditions, for a sufficiently long time, even the least efficient equilibrium will move to the high efficient state. The total social welfare depends on how fact such a transition takes place. We characterize the time needed for such a transition, and analyze the factors affecting the transition speed. We find that the relatively low trust level in China, the insufficient market institutions, the insufficient competition, and the relatively low technology level, all contribute to the slow transition from the low efficient state to the high efficient state.

Abstrat:The law-enforcement draws great attention under the background of complete law regime. Most scholars attribute the non-enforcement of law to high direct cost of law-enforcement. Their explanation is of great success except that they ignored one special phenomenon of selective law-enforcement which means the law is always enforced differently under different circumstances. This paper explains it as an intended behavior of government which tries to minimize the total cost including direct and indirect harm, direct and indirect law-enforcement cost with residual rights of law-enforcement to realize its political, economic or social targets when facing different situation.

Abstrat:This article estimates the effect of house heads job opportunities on those of their sons in the 1990s. Using a longitudinal data set CHNS, cross section estimates show that the intergenerational correlation of off-farm job opportunities decreased in the 1990s, indicating rising mobility. Human capital explains part of the correlation. Time-invariant factors account for significant part of the correlation as well, especially in the early 1990s. In fixed effect models, the intergenerational correlation increased.

Abstrat:This survey summarizes some uses of non-linear dynamics in the realm of macroeconomics. Non-linear dynamics has flourished in the stage of dynamic economic analysis since the 1980s,it is an important attempt of breaking linear paradigm. Non-linear analysis often comes to significant conclusions which differ from equilibrium analysis:output-employment system exhibits non-linearity and asymmetry under the outside shocks,the positive-feedback mechanism exists between the economic decline and the economic increasement.Macroeconomic policies have asymmetric effect on economy. Capital market is not random walk,chaos universally exists in the capital market. Non-linear dynamics provides a new train of thought for Chinas macroeconomic researchers.