Abstrat:This paper discusses the growth effect of fiscal policy in an AK model with endogenous labor supply.It is found that fiscal policy could affect the long-run growth rate through their effects on household's labor-leisure choice,consumption-saving choice,and the proportion of public productive expenditure in total output.Using numerical simulation,it is found that Barro's(1990) inverted-U relationship between the growth rate and the income tax rate will not hold.Using cross-province data from 1997 to 2007 in China,the growth effect of various public productive expenditures have been investigated.It is found that the growth effect of public productive expenditure may be quite different among regions and the public productive expenditure may do not have positive growth effect.

Abstrat:On the field of fiscal decentralization study,the study about tax decentralization has long been neglected.This article sums up and compares four contract models about tax decentralization between central government and local government,which are fixed rent contract,share contract,tax sharing contract and agent levying contract.On the aim of respectively maximizing local,central and national fiscal revenue,the article gets three propositions about the tax endeavor and tax decentralization,and proves that central government often faces the choice to maximize the scale of national fiscal revenue or to strengthen the centralization of central government fiscal revenue.The change of tax decentralization in 1994 is from fixed rent contract and share contract dominant contract to tax sharing contract dominant contract,which inpels high tax growth and keeps central government revenue concentration rate stable from then on.

Abstrat:In many settings,policymakers are unable to restrict the effect of a particular policy to targeted economic agents or regulated economic behaviors only.Further,policies could interact with each other in the public domain thereby complicating implemented impacts.To illustrate this challenge we consider the issue of affordable housing provision which is getting increased attention from Chinese policymakers.We set up a Tiebout style general equilibrium framework to illustrate the impact of the affordable housing provision policies together with the public school admission policies on the community formation of urban China.We demonstrate the risks of ghettoizing urban Chinese landscapes from the interaction of the current housing policy and school admission policy,probably the unintended consequence by either policy,and make our recommendations to ways that would counteract those risks.

Abstrat:It is well known that Neoclassical growth model implies that,in long-run,economy may converge or diverge.Convergence means that the growth rate for output per capita only depends on growth path determined by the exogenous technological progress rate.While the divergence means that economy would exhibit accelerated growth rate and the growth rate of output per capita is increasing.One way to judge whether the economy is in convergence or divergence state is to estimate the speed of convergence.Based on a semi-parametric varying coefficient panel data model,by using provincial level data in China from 1978 to 2006,this paper shows that,on one hand,China's economy is diverging with high growth rate now,and on the other hand,there exists the tendency for convergence in richer areas,and the trend of catching up effect in the poorer areas.Furthermore,for the conclusions obtained in this paper,we give economic explanations,which is related to resource restriction and government policy.

Abstrat:Unlike most empirical studies on productivity that assume capital stock is an ideal proxy for capital service,we first estimate capital service using the financial data from the Chinese listed companies,and then apply it in our production function analysis with other input and output variables from the same source.Different from studies using aggregate industry data that suggest a cross board improvement in productivity since the late 1990s,especially following China's WTO entry,our findings show that during the period 1999—2004 only the Chinese enterprises in some capital intensive industries,such as machinery,electronics and basic chemicals,showed some improvement in their productivity performance,whereas those in labor-intensive industries,such as food and textiles,demonstrated a stagnation or decline in productivity.We argue that existing distortions in resource allocation are likely the major factors behind the unsatisfactory performance in the Chinese listed companies.Our international comparison exercise also suggests that in machinery and electronics industries,the Chinese enterprises are substantially less competitive than their Japanese and Korean counterparts.This on the other hand means that there is a great potential for the Chinese enterprises to increase their international competitiveness should the distortions are removed.

Abstrat:The basic objective of people's economic activities is to maximize interests while such interests are obtained through distribution.Emergence of interest distribution mechanism is in turn the result of power games,and the setup of power determines that of distribution,both the distribution system and the power system are identical.To attain full utilization and optimal allocation of resources so that social interests and welfare are optimized,the basic way is to realize,at the same hierarchy level,power reciprocity among different economic agents and meanwhile to make sure that power and responsibility are symmetric for the same economic agent.Borrowing the game theories,this paper proves the above arguments,with mathematical derivation.

Abstrat:Nationalization and political control over banks become a global trend in the recent financial crisis.Under the circumstances it is meaningful to study long term social cost of political control over banks,although it seems inevitable to have government intervention in bank to stabilize financial market in short run.This paper establishes a general theoretical model to explain bad assets of banks generated through interactions of politicians and bank managers.In specific,the paper reveals that agency problem of politicians is the main cause of bad assets type Ⅱ in banks,while moral hazard of bank managers responsible for bad assets type Ⅲ.Under political control,moral hazard problem is most likely to worsen off and demonstrates a diverging tendency.At least government has to keep providing subsidy to banks,but finally the fiscal burden will be shifted to public via tax hike or money-printing.Politically and economically,it is a very costly and non-sustainable model in long term.This conclusion is not only meaningful for China's bank reforms in the future,but also has implication to most developed countries in the recent full-fledged bailout and nationalization campaigns over banks.

Abstrat:This paper proposes the realization of export growth miracle in Chinese coastal regions which is featured by the consumer products and caused by massive advanced machinery importing from foreign countries.This is the rational response of corporations in coastal regions driven by export-orientation strategy and facing more rigorous product quality standards in foreign markets while native machinery manufacturers can not offer eligible machinery.This fact can be described as the terms of 'importing-for-exporting' or 'importing-induced exporting'.We introduce the preference to product quality into the monopolistic competition trade model,and find after the improvement of product quality,demand from international markets faced by consumer product exporters will increase.Import of eligible machinery can improve the short-term profit and exporting size of consumer product exporters,and expand the total industry's exporting.

Abstrat:This article establishes a dynamic game model within the framework of cumulative innovation to explore the impact of foreign technology transfer on indigenous R&D.The game model demonstrates that both FDI and Licensing(include other styles of technology trade) has two effects:positive and negative.Using the industrial panel data on China's both large-and medium-sized enterprises during 1999—2004 to conduct system GMM estimation,this paper examines these effects.Our results show that technology purchased have both the direct substitute effect to reduce the R&D investment,and the indirect technology spillover effect to promote the indigenous R&D investment;the competition effect of FDI has significant promoting and prohibiting influence in the short term,but not in the long term;the spillover effect of FDI is not significant in either long term or short term.Combining the theoretical and empirical study together,we conclude that technologies we purchased are indeed advanced and our innovation ability has improved through technology imports,and FDI has no significant influences on our innovation activity.

Abstrat:The current system of energy transportation is a fragility part for the China's economic development.Traditional energy transportation system including railway,highway and water transportation can not satisfy increasing energy transportation requirement.It is an urgent matter to construct a modern energy transportation system that integrates electricity transmission.China is a large country and its energy resource distribution is very uneven.In addition to performing basic function of energy transportation,the proposed modern integrative energy transportation system will play an important role in optimal allocation of energy and environmental resources.By analyzing the problems of current energy transportation in China,we found that the current transportation system,which mostly relies on railway coal transportation,is not the best choice.In this study,applying a fuzzy multi-objective and multi-index transportation model,we propose an energy transportation system to optimize time cost,system loss and investment requirement.The proposed integrative energy transportation system will require changes of present power plant location principle that balances power demand and supply at local level.The new integrative energy transportation system will result in increasing the share and efficiency of power transmission between regions.

Abstrat:This paper provides evidence about the relationship of institutional environment,capital structure,and industry competition.We test the impact of institutional environment and capital structure on industry competition by using the sample formed by the listed firms in the manufacture industry.Under controlling the endogeneity problem,the paper finds that institutional environment and capital structure are important to industry competition.High debt negatively affects corporate position in industry competition.Institutional environment makes a positive effect on corporate industry competition by reducing financing restrictions.Financing constrains also change the corporate behavior in industry competition,but the sensitivity of behavior to financing constrains is different between two types of institutional environment.Our evidence suggests the institutional environment and capital structure have significant effect on the corporate competition behavior,thus are important for real economy.

Abstrat:Would "Lucky Number Worship" has a significant impact on stock price? We study the stocks with trading codes ended with "8"listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange.Our finding is that the "Lucky Number Worship" does have impacts on investment behaviors and stock prices.On one hand,"fortune codes are expensive".On the other hand,"fortune codes do not beget fortune".Our study could help with investment decisions and enrich to some extent the research on the relationship between culture and finance,irrational behavior and market efficiency.

Abstrat:This paper analyzes the function of seller coalition on online auction site-Taobao in contract enforcement.Severe prisoner's dilemma exists in online auction sites.Sellers and Taobao established seller coalition to solve this problem as response.Seller coalition can use its collective reputation as hostage to undertake credible commitment to buyers:sellers belonging to a coalition will not cheat buyers;if a seller cheats buyers,coalition will punish him.Coalition systems increase punishment buyers can inflict on sellers and enhance the role of reputation mechanism.Under certain condition,commitment undertaken by coalition is credible.This paper explores how private parties establish institution to self-discipline and provide credible commitment,and therefore enhance the enforcement.