Abstrat:Based on the latest empirical literature,it estimates Chinese local governments cyclical policy response function using an annual balanced panel for 27 provinces over the period of 1994—2004 and System GMM method.We find,whenever based on total expenditure or decomposed expenditure,Chinese local governments conduct a more active expansion-biased fiscal policy during the recession than during the boom.It thinks that this policy response is an interactive outcome of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization and soft budget constraint.Then,it verifies our hypothesis using two government competition indicators.Finally,we give relevant policy suggestions.

Abstrat:Based on compelled technological change hypothesis and the unique features of economic growth and structure in China,this paper develops an extended AS-AD framework by incorporating excess production and structural imbalances.The article employs the underlying framework and explains the interactions among economic fluctuations,unbalanced growth,wave phenomenon,and prices disparity in China.Using data over 1978—2007,the paper provides empirical evidence showing that national control power and technology import have significant impacts on investment,prices,income gap,and economic structure in China.It also shows that increase in income gap is an important factor that drives down effective demand in China.The finding in this paper raises new questions and implications in analyzing the features of economic growth in China with traditional macroeconomic framework.

Abstrat:Combined the newly developed Shapely Value Decomposition method with Heckman two-step estimation,this paper accounts for the level and difference of urban Chinas earning inequality by gender,education,district,and experience,using the data of China Health and Nutrition Survey1990—2005.We find that:1Selection bias is important in accounting urban earning inequality;2Contribution of education to urban earning inequality tends to increase;3Contribution of experience to urban earning inequality decreased continually;4Contribution of district to urban earning inequality increases.Technology progress,rapid industry structure change during economic growth and property right system reform,wage system reform,restructuring of state-owned enterprises during the process of transition are potential interpretations for these findings.

Abstrat:rights and farmers agricultural investment,it is found that secured land rights have no significant impact on farmers total agricultural investment and land rental market;and that land rights,land transfers and leases,per se,may not lead to expansion in farm scale and agricultural investment without non-farm employment opportunities.Due to the current small farm size and low profitability in agriculture,financial institutions are not willing to provide loans to farmers even land is permitted to be the collateral.It is also found that,along with accessibility,the size and profitability are not only major factors in determining agricultural investment,but also major determinants of accessibility to loan itself,as they are important guaranty of paying back the loan.As the seemly insecured land rights due to periodical redistribution does not significantly impact the farm scale and profitability,it may not have significant impact on farmers accessibility to loan,and on agricultural investment.Therefore,further reform of the land rights and land market systems may not have significant impact on farmers agricultural investment under current situation;increasing non-farm employment opportunities is the key of expanding farm size and improving farm profitability,hence the key of promoting farmers` agriculture investment.

Abstrat:This paper uses a novel approach in testing various theories of capital structure,taking into consideration the unique institutional background and corporate governance characteristics inherent in publicly listed firms in China.The paper posits that macroeconomic conditions affect corporate capital structure and derives several testable hypotheses based on the trade-off,pecking order and market timing theories.It then estimates a panel data fractional response model and a panel data quartile regression model.The paper finds that corporate capital structure is counter-cyclical,significantly negatively related to proxies of default risk,but unrelated to credit quota and stock market performance.The empirical results are consistent with the pecking order theory but are against the trade-off theory and market timing hypothesis.The results also suggest that corporate financing choices vary with macroeconomic conditions.During a period of economic boom,firms prefer internal financing over equity and debt.However,during a period of economic downturn,firms generally prefer debt over equity.

Abstrat:The impact mechanism of energy price on Chinas general price level is one of the important issues needed to be studied in the process of reforming energy pricing mechanism.It is also important for the macroeconomic decision-making.This paper firstly applies input-output price impact model to simulate the variations of Chinas general price level caused by energy price increases in two scenarios:ienergy price is controlled by,andiiis not controlled by the government.The results show that even assuming the increases of energy prices could be transmitted completely and smoothly into the general price level,the energy price increase has relatively weak impact on the general price level,if the effect of price expectation is not considered.Price control does have certain impact on the passing-through of the energy price into the general price level.Further,based on the recursive SVAR model,this paper also investigates the time-lags between the energy price increases and the rises of general price level.The results indicate that the increase in energy price has little impact on PPI in the first month but will cause PPI to increase significantly after six months.Because of the weak impact on CPI,the lag time from energy price increase to CPI could not be fully displayed.However,the increase in PPI will have a persistent impact on CPI,after a five months lag.

Abstrat:This paper builds a rent-seeking model in an unbalanced system change where political system remains stable but economic system is in market-oriented reform,finding that when politicians control the redistribution power of resource,in the process of market liberalization,besides the efficiency of political system,the exogenous market restraints such as market structure and demand elasticity also determine the firms optimal rent,which leads to both rent dissipation and short-term economic growth.However,in Solow economy with rent dissipation,the growth that cant converge to balanced path for the sake of rent restrain,can be restricted in a lower capital level.We try to research the reason of unbalanced system change,suggesting the long-term economic growth depend on the harmony between political system and economic system.

Abstrat:Based on the economic data of 66 countries,this paper investigates the internal relationship between credit expansion,financial regulation and financial crisis.Empirical analysis tends to show that the procyclical interactions between credit expansion,asset prices and financial supervision are the basic mechanism behind financial crisis.Under the effects of procyclicality,financial crisis obtains the self-fulfilling way of accumulation and magnification,while the mismatched and ineffectual financial supervision not only has no use in preventing crisis but also may lead to even worse outcomes.

Abstrat:The theory of constructing the first-best contract,represented by TCEtransaction cost economicsand GHMGrossman-Hart-Moore,doesnt solve the problem of source,allocation and enforceability of power within the firm.Bargaining power in the co-operative game model developed by Aoki isnt endogenetic.Under the framework of co-operative game theory,we can educe the conclusion below:The power within a real firm is the outcome of bargaining between contractors,whose size of control power is determined by his size of bargaining power.Only by this,the power within a firm is not only existent but auto-self-enforcing.And the size of bargaining power and thus the control power within a firm is determined by the size of substitutable and in inverse proportion to latter.Moreover,the attitude to risk can affect bargaining power and thus the allocation of power within a firm.

Abstrat:Utilizing an individual investor survey in 9 cities in China in 2006,this paper studies the effect of labor income risk on investors participation in risky financial assets for the first time,and explores the effects of background risks and a range of other factors extensively.Results obtained include that labor income risk,business investment,and real estate investment reduce investors participation in risky financial assets.Health status exerts insignificant effect,whereas medical social security or commercial health insurance promotes investors participation.Risk aversion is statistically insignificant.Our findings provide some policy implications.

Abstrat:Employing a within-subjects design,in this paper we run a two-person anonymous and absolutely strange matching quaternate experiments with suvery questions.We found there are widely exsited with four kinds of classic prosocial behaviors and we also detected a significant relations between these different kinds of prosocial behaviors in different games.Meanwhile we decomposed and tested the social preferences behind the trust and trustworthiness actions in the trust game and the cooperation actions in the public goods game.We found that the variance in trust actions is accounted for by expectation of trustworthiness but not altruism,while variance in trustworthiness actions is mainly accounted for by altruism with a comparatively small role of reciprocity.And the pattern of cooperation behavior in public goods game is consistent with inequality aversion.