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Media Monitoring, Media Governance and Managers’ Compensation
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TitleMedia Monitoring, Media Governance and Managers’ Compensation  
AuthorYang Deming  
OrganizationGuanghua School of Management, Peking University,Accounting School of YUFE 
Emailyangdeming2001@sina.com 
Key WordsManagers’ Compensation ; Media; Monitoring; Corporate Governance 
AbstractBased on the background of Lists’ managers’ compensation consisting of astronomical salaries and zero pay, Our paper finds that media plays a role in monitoring because there are more negative press coverage in the lists of astronomical salaries and zero pay than other lists. We find little evidence that firms respond to negative media coverage by decreasing managers’compensation or increasing managers’turnover, and negative media coverage can’t improve the susceptibility between management compensation and performance. The investigation means that the meida role of monitoring can’t improve lists’ corporate governance because other surveillance mechanism and reputation system have lapsed. 
Serial NumberWP128 
Time2011-10-27 
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