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Social Role, Heterogenous Preferences and Public Goods Provision
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TitleSocial Role, Heterogenous Preferences and Public Goods Provision  
AuthorZhou Yean1,Lian Hongquan1, 2,Chen Yefeng3, 4,Zuo Congying1,Ye Hang4,5  
Organization1: School of Economics, Renmin University of China; 2: Public Administration Department, Shantou University; 3: School of Economics and Business Administration, Beijing Normal University; 4: School of Economics, Zhejiang University;5: Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences, Zhejiang University 
Emailrendayean@163.com,lianhongquan999@163.com,lenggone@gmail.com,zuocong@126.com,yehang@china.com 
Key WordsPublic Goods Experiment;Heterogeneity;Identity 
AbstractBasing on the two-stage public goods experiment, this paper sheds light on the distribution of individuals’ heterogenous preferences and the direct and indirect effects of social role on the public goods provision. The experimental results indicate that the individuals’ decision-making behaviors in public goods are heterogeneity, and the free-riding of free-rider and self-serving bias in conditional cooperators are two typical facts in the public goods experiment, which play a crucial role in the understanding of the aggregation behavior in public goods. And the results also show that different types of individuals’ preferences have distinct effects on voluntary contribution of public goods game, while the social roles such as gender and the identity of cadres have significant effects on public goods provision, whose effects are direct and indirect that via the heterogenous preferences. These results are in favor of the theory of the direct and indirect effect of social role on public goods provision.  
Serial NumberWP288 
Time2012-07-13 
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