| Abstract | Behind the implementation of corporate social responsibility, whether it is in the interests of the interests of shareholders or management? The management of “self-serving tool “or shareholders “value strategy”? This issue has become a hot research issue in the inter-discipline of finance and management field. This paper analyses the way corporate social responsibility affects the stock price crash risk from a unique perspective of asymmetric risk. We conclude our study with four arguments that come as follows. Firstly, corporate social responsibility has a significant positive relationship with the risk of stock price crash risk. It shows that there is a significant crash effect of corporate social responsibility in Chinese capital market. Secondly, in the aspect of disclosure form, we find out that the crash effect of corporate social responsibility only exists in the mandatory disclosure group, not in the voluntary disclosure group. In the aspect of whether to accept third-party verification, we find out that the crash effect of corporate social responsibility only exists in no assurance group. Thirdly, we find that the crash effect of corporate social responsibility has complete investment path and partial accounting path, but not the accounting path and tax path through the path verification.therefor, the way of generating crash effect is: mangers abuse social responsibility to construct bad information environment and make non-efficient investment to hide management hoarding behavior. Lastly, internal control and external supervision of institution investors cannot have an effective control on the crash effect of corporate social responsibility, which indicates that the institution of internal control and external supervision have not played the role of “market monitor” and “market stabilizer ”currently in the capital market. In general, we prove that corporate social responsibility reflects the “self-interest tool” rather than “value strategy”. |