| Abstract | Most of the research assumed that the food safety regulatory policy should be more string, which means that more institution supply would decrease the opportunity of food safety policy violation. This paper is based on the rational and limited rational of food safety decision making, using the method of simulation and find that: strengthen the regulatory power would have dual side impact on the food producers food policy violation behavior, and in different situation the same regulatory power would have different result, which means that strengthen the regulatory power only could not guarantee the food safety. In some situation, with the regulatory power enhancing, the food policy violation behavior would increase (the dilemma of regulation). In the meanwhile, the average revenue and the total revenue of industry would also decrease (the dilemma of food policy violation). As a result, this paper comes up with the theory of regulatory balance in food safety governance. Based on this theory, we concluded that food safety regulatory institution should transform from strengthen regulatory power only, to optimize the structural regulatory institution arrangement, which means that when regulatory resource was scarce, government should take the food producer, consumers and regulators into consideration. Government should adjust the regulatory power based on the producer revenue and consumer payment willingness, in return the different level of regulatory power would impact the producer revenue and consumers payment willingness. Finally the paper concludes that government should balance the regulatory power, producer revenue and consumers payment willingness, instead of strengthening the regulatory power. |