Economic Research Journal (Monthly) Vol.43 No.6 June, 2008
CONTENTS
The Political Economy of Emission in China: Will a Low Carbon Growth Be Incentive Compatible in Next Decade and Beyond?
………………………………………………Cai Fang, Du Yang and Wang Meiyan (4)
Enterprise
Evolution: Important Path of Industrial TFP Growth in China
…………………………………………Li Yuhong, Wang Hao and Zheng Yuxin (12)
Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Policy: A
Proposal for Small and Less Developed Economies………………………………..Gong Gang, Gao
Jian and He Xuezhong (25)
The Effects of Intergovernmental
Assignments of Public Revenue and Expenditure Responsibility
on the Regional Economic Growth
…………………………………………………Jia Junxue and Guo Qingwang (37)
The Optimal Transfer Shares of Stateowned Firms to Social Secuity
Fund
……………………………………………………Yang Jun and Gong Liutang (50)
Telecommunications Investment:
Infrastructure, Network Effect and Regional Disequilibrium
………………………………Luo Yuze, Rui Mingjie, Luo Laijun and Zhu Shanli (61)
The Ineffective of Public Policies and
Excessive Concentration of Production and Population
……………………………………………………………………Fan Hongzhong (73)
Spillover Effects of the Three Growth Poles
on the Inland Regions of China
…………………………………………………………Pan Wenqing and Li Zinai (85)
Does Foreign Direct Investment Benefit
Chinese Indigenous Firms? Effects and Channels
……………………………………………………………………Lu Jiangyong (95)
Entrepreneurs' Human Capital and
Institution Selection and Innovation in PrivateEnterprises in China………………………………………………………………Liu Jianxiong (107)
The Determinants of Capital Structure and
Equity Financing Preference in Listed
Chinese Companies…………………………………..Xiao
Zezhong and Zou Hong (119)
Analysis on the Influence of Governance
Structure to Familycontrolled Tunnelin
g Behavior of Chinese Private Listed
Companies
……………………………………………………………………Shen Minghao (135)
Experimental Researches of Sequential
DecisionMaking under
Imperfect Information
——Experimental
Tests of the Bayesian Model for Herd Behavior
………………………………….Zhu Xianchen, Li Yanqi and Zeng Huaxiang (145)
Theoretical Development and Application
Research on Law and Economics:
A Summary of the 6th Law and Economics
Forum
…………………………………………………Shi Jinchuan and Dong Xuebing (157)
The
Political Economy of Emission in China:
Will
a Low Carbon Growth Be Incentive Compatible in Next Decade and Beyond?
Cai
Fang, Du Yang and Wang Meiyan
Abstract:
The effectiveness of emission reduction
policy lies on the endogenous demands for
change in growth pattern and requirement
for better environment. Only when economic development moves to the stage at
which economic growth becomes productivitydriven, can the policy package aimed to significantly reduce
greenhouse gas emission be incentive\|compatible with the development
motivation of local governments and behavior of enterprises. By estimating the
Environment Kuznets Curve, which predicts the turning point of emission from increase
to decline, this paper examines the induced need for the Chinese economy to
implement emission reduction strategy.The results show that it is not enough to
wait for the turning point to come, unless the policy implementation can be
further strengthened in order to make incentive compatible among the central
and local governments, enterprises, and people.
Key Words:Emission Reduction; Environmental
Kuznets Curve; Economic Growth Pattern
JEL Classification:O130, Q280, R580
Enterprise Evolution: Important Path of Industrial TFP Growth in China
Li
Yuhong1,
Wang Hao2
and Zheng Yuxin1
(1. Institute of Quantitative
& Technical Economics, CASS;
2.
School of Business, University of International Business and Economics)
Abstract:This paper studied the change in
industrial TFP in China from 2000 to 2005 from an evolutionary point of view.
It analyzed the respective contributions to industrial TFP growth of technical
progress and resource reallocation, employing BHC and shiftshare approach with firmlevel data. It found that the
TFP of surviving firms tops and the TFP of entering firm grows fastest while
the TFP of the exiting firms remains lowest and rises slowest. It also found
that technical progress of the surviving firms accounts nearly 50% for TFP growth
while reallocation of resources mainly due to turnover of firms contributes the
other half. On one hand it shows the significance of competition mechanism and
investment to the quality of economic growth, on the other hand in the long run
it is very important to realize a sustainable domestic industrial development
that the incumbents build up the self innovation ability and quicken the pace
of technical progress with the weakening potential of institutional reform and
the maturing of industry during transition.
Key Words:Enterprise Evolution; TFP;
Technical Progress; Resource Reallocation; Nonparametric Estimation
JEL Classification:D240,O470,C140
Exchange
Rate Regime and Monetary Policy:
A
Proposal for Small and Less Developed Economies
Gong
Gang, Gao Jian and He Xuezhong
(Nankai University; China Development Bank; University of Technology, Sydney)
Abstract:
We investigate the monetary policy under
the assumption that the capital market was open while the exchange rate was
fixed. Our purpose is to find whether it is still possible for the economy in
this case to keep the effective monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic
economy. For this, we suggest two institutional restrictions. Given the
restrictions, we demonstrate that the monetary policy can still be effective.
The implication of such an institutional design in exchange rate regime is also
discussed with special reference to a small and less developed economy.
Key Words: Open Economy Trilemma; Monetary Policy;
Exchange Rate Regime; Macrodynamic Model
JEL Classification:E120, E320, C620
The
Effects of Intergovernmental Assignments of Public Revenue and
Expenditure
Responsibility on the Regional Economic Growth
Jia
Junxue and Guo Qingwang
(China
Financial Policy Research Center,Renmin University of China)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the position of the
intergovernmental assignments of public revenue and expenditure responsibility
based on regional economic growth perspective. Our analyses suggest that:(1)
total and social expenditure responsibility assignments have significant
adverse impacts on economic growth, economic and maintenance expenditure
responsibility division have positive impacts on economic growth, while total
revenue responsibility division's effects are implicit, which suggests that the
intergovernmental division of public revenue and expenditure responsibility is
not better;(2) the intergovernmental assignments of public revenue and
expenditure responsibility have significant threshold effects on regional
economic growth, which is mainly depends on economic development stage as well
as total and social expenditure responsibility;(3) the position of total and
social expenditure responsibility assignments has become more better since
1994,while the position of economic and maintenance expenditure responsibility
assignments has become more unreasonable.
Key Words:Intergovernmental Assignments of
Public Revenue Responsibility; Intergovernmental Assignments of Public
Expenditure Responsibility; Regional Economic Growth
JEL Classification:H730, O110
The
Optimal Transfer Shares of Stateowned
Firms
to Social Security Fund
Yang
Jun
(School of Labor and Human Resources, Renmin University of China)
Gong
Liutang
(Guanghua
School of Management, Peking University)
Abstract:
Without asymmetric information or
externality, the social planned equilibrium is equivalent to the competitive
equilibrium in an infinite horizon framework; however, in a finite horizon
model, it can be proved that this equivalence will not held yet. Because of the
possibility of dynamic inefficiency, the competitive equilibrium is not Paretooptimal. This paper introduces
the transfer of stateowned shares to social security fund in an overlapping generation
model to study the optimal transfer of shares. The optimal transfer share of
stateowned firms
to social security fund can be determined by the replication of the social
planned equilibrium with the competition equilibrium. The conclusion is greatly
helpful for the operation of China's NSSF(National Social Security Fund)in the future.
Key Words:Social Security Fund; Social
Planner Economy; Pareto Efficiency
JEL Classification:D400,H200,H300
Telecommunications
Investment:
Infrastructure,
Network Effect and Regional Disequilibrium
Luo
Yuze1, Rui
Mingjie2, Luo
Laijun3 and
Zhu Shanli4
(1.
China Academy of Telecommunications Research of MII and Guanghua School of
Management,
Peking University;
2.
Management School, Fudan University; 3. Economics School, Renmin Universi
ty
of China;
4.
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University)
Abstract:In this paper we investigate how
telecommunications infrastructure investment affects economic growth by
estimating a structural model with the data set covering 31 provinces and six
years from the year 2000 to 2005. We find that the average marginal effect of
telecommunications investment is 2376 percent, which is higher than social infrastructure investment
by 6758 percent,
but it takes on a decreasing trend. The empirical study on different regions
reveals that there is distinct regional disequilibrium that the investment
contribution to productivity in the West is much higher than that in the
others, which is opposite to the instinct. Therefore, it is imperative to keep
increasing investment in the West, make a structural adaptation in the East and
stimulate telecommunications consumption in the Middle. Our study breaks
through the previous literature and draws a conclusion opposite to Roller and
Waverman(2001), which will be helpful for telecommunications investment decisionmakers.
Key Words: Telecommunications; Infrastructure Investment;
Marginal Contribution; Regional Disequilibrium
JEL Classification:L960,R100
The
Ineffective of Public Policies and Excessive Concentration
of
Production and Population
Fan
Hongzhong
(Huazhong University of Science and Technology)
Abstract:Through a model of the flow of
capital and population, it is found that without investment control and with
the flow of population, policies of reducing the costs of commuting and housing,
or favorable policies only for large cities will result in even more excessive
concentration, higher cost of commuting and housing. However, the policies may
cause false prosperity, that is nominal GDP go up, but a lot of social product
is offset by the cost of commuting and housing, the real income and welfare of
most people don't change except for land owners.
Key Words:Cost of Commuting and Housing;
Noneffectiveness;
Excessive Concentration
JEL Classification:R230, R130, R590
Spillover
Effects of the Three Growth Poles on the Inland Regions of China
Pan
Wenqing and Li Zinai
(School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University)
Abstract:
Based on the multiregions inputoutput approach, this paper
researches on the spillover effects of the three growth poles, Pearl River
Triangle Area, Yangtze River Triangle Area and PBohai region, on the inland regions of China The
backward linkage shows that about 109 percent of the total repercussion effects
induced by the final demand of the three growth poles go to inland regions.
Among them, the greater part goes to the central regions and a little to
Northeast, Northwest and Southwest. Comparing the spillover effects from the
three growth poles on inland regions, we find that Yangtze River Triangle Area
has the largest effects, then the Pearl River Triangle Area, and PanBohai region has the smallest
one. However, PanBohai
region has the largest effects on Northeast and on Northwest, and Pearl River
Triangle Area has the largest effects on Southwest. The sectorial comparison
shows that the top five sectors with the largest spillover effects on inland
regions are almost the same. These top five sectors account for about 40
percent of the overall spillover effects of the three growth poles on inland
regions.
Key Words: Regional Economy; Growth Poles; Inland Regions;
Input output
Model; Spillover Effects
JEL Classification:O400,R100
Does
Foreign Direct Investment Benefit Chinese Indigenous Firms?
Effects
and Channels
Lu
Jiangyong
(School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University)
Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the impact of
foreign direct investment (FDI) on productivity of Chinese indigenous firms
with a representative sample during 1998—2005. We find foreign presence at
county level and region level affects Chinese indigenous firms differently. Our
analyses show that headtohead
competition with foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), in domestic market and
foreign markets, generally reduces productivity of Chinese indigenous firms.
Meanwhile, possible technology and skill spillovers within small geographic
scopes increase Chinese indigenous firms productivity. However, whether indigenous firms benefit or suffer
from foreign presence depends partially on their ownership: state owned firms suffer
the most from foreign presence, while private firm benefit the most.
Key Words: Foreign Direct Investment; Indigenous Enterprise; Productivity; Spillovers
JEL Classification:F210, F230, O300
Entrepreneurs'
Human Capital and Institution Selection
and
Innovation in Private Enterprises in China
Liu
Jianxiong
(Postdoctoral Workstation in
Institute of Economics and Graduate School, CASS)
Abstract:Based on the investigation data,
this paper, by using the method of Ordered Logistic Regression, analyzes
empirically the key factors of the human capital of the entrepreneurs in
private enterprises that affect the selection and innovation of the
institutions in corporation governance. This paper draws the following
conclusions: 1) the
higher of the entrepreneurial human capital, the more likely for their
enterprises to adopt modern corporation institutions. 2) The accumulation of managerial
experiences and leadership of the private entrepreneurs is conducive to their
selection and innovation of the institutions in corporation governance. 3) In Chinese private
enterprises, the separation of the owners and managers will force the owners to
take some measures in property rights to control the managers. 4) The CPC membership of the
founders of private enterprises and the managers is a key factor to the
institution selection and innovation in corporation governance.
Key Words:Entrepreneurial Human Capital; Private
Enterprises; Institution Selection and Innovation
JEL Classification:C250,M130
The
Determinants of Capital Structure and Equity Financing
Preference
in Listed Chinese Companies
Xiao
Zezhong and Zou Hong
(Xiangtan University; City University of Hong Kong)
Abstract:
This paper investigates the share issuing
preference conjecture and determinants of capital structure in listed Chinese
firms. It provides a method to formally test the share issuing preference and
obtained strong evidence that supports the hypothesis. The results indicate
that although in general state ownership, legal person ownership and foreign
ownership do not have a significant effect on capital structure, a high level
of state ownership is associated with a high level of long term debt. These
results are inconsistent with the argument in the literature that the high
level of state ownership is a cause of the share issuing preference.
Additionally, the variables (firm size, asset tangibility, growth and
profitability) that are found to be important in developed countries al
so play a similar role in capital structure
decisions in listed Chinese firms. However, they are associated with leverage
in ways different from those in other developing counties.
Key Words:Agency Theory;Capital Structure; Financing Behavior; Pecking
Order Theory; Static Tradeoff Theory
JEL Classification:G320,G340
Analysis
on the Influence of Governance Structure to Familycontrolled
Tunneling
Behavior of Chinese Private Listed Companies
Shen
Minghao
(Guangzhou University of Foreign Studies)
Abstract:
In the paper, we choose the whole body of
280 private listed companies by the end of 2004 as research subjects and
distinguish Capitalistscontrolled(CFB)
from Entrepreneurs controlled (EFB).The
results of regression analysis on family occupying of listed companies' capital
show: capitalistfamilies
incline to conduct tunnel behavior by the means of establishing multilayer control chain; members of
the entrepreneurfamilies
working in listed company is conducive to the formation of collusion, digging
tunnel and transferring resources; companies whose controlling shareholders
exist in the form of enterprise groups suffer from being emptied more
seriously; in familycontrolled listed companies, independent directors have not played
an effective supervisory role; the equity ratio of general manager and
intensity of the tunneling behavior show Ushaped relationship, “the incentive effects of regulation" and
“collusion draining effect" existing. We find the more the business is
controlled by capitalist, the more possible tunnel behavior is to be cnducted.
So we think the listed companies should be classed and supervised separately.
Key Words:Tunneling Behavior; Affiliated
Transactions; Governance Structure; Familycontrolled; Manipulative Shareholder
JEL Classification:D230, G320,G390
Experimental
Researches of Sequential DecisionMaking under
Imperfect
Information
——Experimental Tests of the
Bayesian Model for Herd Behavior
Zhu
Xianchen, Li Yanqi and Zeng Huaxiang
(School
of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology)
Abstract:
elen
and Kariv(2004a) established the Bayesian Learning Model addinga setup with continuous signal and discrete action, which is in allusion to the social
learning setting with sequential decisionmaking under imperfect information. The Bayesian Model, however,
can't be used to explain the experiments' results well. This paper attempts to
study whether sequential individuals' behavior under imperfect information
accords with the prediction of the Bayesian Model by doing economic
experiments. By designing and organizing two kinds of sequential decisionmaking experiments under
imperfect information, we imitate and test the general Bayesian Model. The
results show that decisionmaker isn't able to calculate his own optimal decision when he can
only get the information of his immediate predecessor's action. Individuals'
behavior can be described by normal distribution approximately. The
distribution of individuals' behavior in different decisionturns doesn't have significant
differences, and they are only able to do the Bayesian calculation in one step
simply.
Key Words:Imperfect Information; Bayesian
Model; Experimental Economics; Herd Behavior
JEL Classification:C910, C920, D820
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