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CONTENTS
Chinese Local
Government, Soft Budget Constraint and Expansion-biased Fiscal
Behavior
…………………………………………………………Fang
Hongsheng and Zhang Jun
(4)
Compelled Technological
Change, Unbalanced Growth, and China's Business Cycle
…………………………………………………………Yuan
Jiang and Zhang Chengsi
(17)
Accounting for Urban
China's Earning Inequality: 1990—2005
…………………………………………………Chen
Binkai, Yang Yishan and Xu Wei
(30)
Land Rights, Nonagricultural
Employment Opportunities and Farmers’ Agricultural Investment
…………………………………………………………
Zhong Funing and Ji Yueqing
(43)
Macroeconomic Conditions
and Corporate Capital Structure
…………………………………………………………Su
Dongwei and Zeng Haijian
(52)
Impact of Energy Price
Increase on General Price Level in China
…………………………………………………………
Lin Boqiang and Wang Feng
(66)
Unbalanced System Change
and Economic Growth: An Rentseeking
Model
……………………………………………………………
Huang Shaoan and Zhao Jian
(80)
Credit Expansion,
Supervisory Mismatch and Financial Crisis: Crosscountry
Evidence
……………………………………………………Ma
Yong, Yang Dong and Chen Yulu (93)
Allocation of Power
within a Firm: A Cooperative Game Model
……………………………………………………………………………
Lu Zhoulai
(106)
Background Risk and
Investors' Participation in Risky Financial Assets
……………………………………………
He Xingqiang, Shi Wei and Zhou Kaiguo
(119)
Prosocial Behaviors and
the Decomposition of Social Preferences
…………………………………………………………………………Chen
Yefeng
(131)
A Summary for the 9th
Forum of Young Economists in China
………………………………………………………
He Jie, Ma Xiao and Yang Dan
(145)
A Book Review
………………………………………………………………………………Lu
Feng
(151)
Chinese Local
Government, Soft Budget Constraint and
Expansion-biased
Fiscal Behavior
Fang Hongsheng and Zhang Jun
(Zhejiang University of Finance &
Economics;
China Center for Economic Studies,Fudan
University)
Abstract:Based
on the latest empirical literature, it estimates Chinese local
government's cyclical policy response function using an annual
balanced panel for 27 provinces over the period of 1994—2004 and
System GMM method. We find, whenever based on total expenditure
or decomposed expenditure, Chinese local governments conduct a
more active expansion-biased fiscal policy during the recession
than during the boom. It thinks that this policy response is an
interactive outcome of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization and
soft budget constraint. Then, it verifies our hypothesis using
two government competition indicators. Finally, we give relevant
policy suggestions.
Key Words:Anti-cyclical
Fiscal Policy; Procyclical Fiscal Policy; Government
Competition; soft Budget Constraint
JEL Classification:D78,E69
Compelled
Technological Change, Unbalanced Growth,
and China’s
Business Cycle
Yuan Jiang and Zhang Chengsi
(Agricultural Bank of China; Renmin
University of China)
Abstract:Based
on compelled technological change hypothesis and the unique
features of economic growth and structure in China, this paper
develops an extended AS-AD framework by incorporating excess
production and structural imbalances. The article employs the
underlying framework and explains the interactions among
economic fluctuations, unbalanced growth, wave phenomenon, and
prices disparity in China. Using data over 1978—2007, the paper
provides empirical evidence showing that national control power
and technology import have significant impacts on investment,
prices, income gap, and economic structure in China. It also
shows that increase in income gap is an important factor that
drives down effective demand in China. The finding in this paper
raises new questions and implications in analyzing the features
of economic growth in China with traditional macroeconomic
framework.
Key Words:Compelled
Technological Change; Unbalanced Growth; Business Cycle
JEL Classification:E32,
E39, E58
Accounting for
Urban China's Earning Inequality: 1990—2005
Chen Binkai, Yang Yishan and Xu Wei
(School of Economics, Central University
of Finance and Economics;
School of International Economics and
Trade, Shandong University of Finance;
CCER, PKU)
Abstract:Combined
the newly developed Shapely Value Decomposition method with
Heckmantwo-step estimation, this paper accounts for the level
and difference of urban China's earning inequality by gender,
education, district, and experience, using the data of China
Health and Nutrition Survey(1990—2005). We find that: (1)
Selection bias is important in accounting urban earning
inequality; (2) Contribution of education to urban earning
inequality tends to increase; (3) Contribution of experience to
urban earning inequality decreased continually; (4) Contribution
of district to urban earning inequality increases. Technology
progress, rapid industry structure change during economic growth
and property right system reform, wage system reform,
restructuring of state-owned enterprises during the process of
transition are potential interpretations for these findings.
Key Words:Earning
Inequality;Heckman
Twostep
Estimation;Shapely
Value Decomposition
JEL Classification:O150,O180,C710
Land Rights, Non-agricultural
Employment Opportunities
and Farmers’
Agricultural Investment
Zhong Funing and Ji Yueqing
(College of Economics and Management,
Nanjing Agricultural University)
Abstract:The
importance of land rights to farmers' agricultural investment
seems being widely accepted. Through comprehensive study of the
relationships between land rights and farmers’ agricultural
investment, it is found that secured land rights have no
significant impact on farmers’ total agricultural investment and
land rental market; and that land rights, land transfers and
leases, perse, may not lead to expansion in farm scale and
agricultural investment without non-farm employment
opportunities. Due to the current small farm size and low
profitability in agriculture, financial institutions are not
willing to provide loans to farmers even land is permitted to be
the collateral. It is also found that, along with accessibility,
the size and profitability are not only major factors
indetermining agricultural investment, but also major
determinants of accessibility to loan itself, as they are
important guaranty of paying back the loan. As the seemly
insecured land rights due to periodical redistribution does not
significantly impact the farm scale and profitability, it may
not have significant impact on farmers' accessibility to loan,
and on agricultural investment. Therefore, further reform of the
land rights and land market systems may not have significant
impact on farmers' agricultural investment under current
situation; increasing non-farm employment opportunities is the
key of expanding farm size and improving farm profitability,
hence the key of promoting farmers’ agriculture investment.
Key Words:Land
Rights; Nonagricultural
Employment Opportunities; Farmers’ Agricultural Investment
JEL Classification:Q150,Q120,R200
Macroeconomic
Conditions and Corporate Capital Structure: Evidence from
Publicly-listed
Firms in China during 1994 and 2007
Su Dongwei and Zeng Haijian
(College of Economics, Jinan University)
Abstract:
This paper uses a novel approach in testing various theories of
capital structure, taking into consideration the unique
institutional background and corporate governance
characteristics inherent in publicly listed firms in China.The
paper posits that macroeconomic conditions affect corporate
capital structure and derives several testable hypotheses based
on the trade-off, pecking order and market timing theories.It
then estimates a panel data fractional response model and a
panel data quartile regression model.The paper finds that
corporate capital structure is counter cyclical, significantly
negatively related to proxies of default risk, but unrelated to
credit quota and stock market performance.The empirical results
are consistent with the pecking order theory but are against the
trade off theory and market timing hypothesis.The results also
suggest that corporate financing choices vary with macroeconomic
conditions.During a period of economic boom, firms prefer
internal financing over equity and debt.However, during a period
of economic downturn, firms generally prefer debt over equity.
Key Words:Capital
Structure, Macroeconomic Conditions, Trade-off Theory, Pecking
Order Theory, Market Timing Hypothesis
JEL Classification:G32,
E20, C33
Impact of Energy
Price Increase on General Price Level in China:
A Study Based on
Input-output
Model and Recursive SVAR Model
Lin Boqiang and Wang Feng
(Xiamen University)
Abstract:The
impact mechanism of energy price on China’s general price level
is one of the important issues needed to be studied in the
process of reforming energy pricing mechanism. It is also
important for the macroeconomic decision-making. This paper
firstly applies input-output price impact model to simulate the
variations of China’s general price level caused by energy price
increases in two scenarios: (i) energy price is controlled by,
and (ii) is not controlled by the government. The results show
that even assuming the increases of energy prices could be
transmitted completely and smoothly into the general price
level, the energy price increase has relatively weak impact on
the general price level, if the effect of price expectation is
not considered. Price control does have certain impact on the
passing-through of the energy price into the general price
level. Further, based on the recursive SVAR model, this paper
also investigates the time-lags between the energy price
increases and the rises of general price level. The results
indicate that the increase in energy price has little impact on
PPI in the first month but will cause PPI to increase
significantly after six months. Because of the weak impact on
CPI, the lag time from energy price increase to CPI could not be
fully displayed. However, the increase in PPI will have a
persistent impact on CPI, after a five months lag.
Key Words:Energy
Price;General
Price Level;Inputoutput
Model;SVAR
Model
JEL Classification:Q43,
D57, C22
Unbalanced System
Change and Economic Growth: An Rent-seeking
Model
Huang Shaoan and Zhao Jian
(Center for Economic Research, Shan Dong
University)
Abstract:
This paper builds a rent-seeking
model in an unbalanced system change where political system
remains stable but economic system is in market-oriented
reform, finding that when politicians control the redistribution
power of resource, in the process of market liberalization,
besides the efficiency of political system, the exogenous market
restraints such as market structure and demand elasticity also
determine the firm’s optimal rent, which leads to both rent
dissipation and short-term
economic growth. However, in Solow economy with rent
dissipation, the growth that can’t converge to balanced path for
the sake of rent restrain, can be restricted in a lower capital
level. We try to research the reason of unbalanced system
change, suggesting the long-term economic growth depend on the
harmony between political system and economic system.
Key Words:
Politic System; Economic System; Unbalanced System Change; Rentseeking
JEL Classification:D11,O20
Credit Expansion,
Supervisory Mismatch and Financial Crisis:
Cross-country
Evidence
Ma Yong,Yang
Dong and Chen Yulu
(China Financial Policy Research Center)
Abstract:Based
on the economic data of 66 countries, this paper investigates
the internal relationship between credit expansion, financial
regulation and financial crisis. Empirical analysis tends to
show that the procyclical interactions between credit expansion,
asset prices and financial supervision are the basic mechanism
behind financial crisis. Under the effects of procyclicality,
financial crisis obtains the self-fulfilling way of accumulation
and magnification, while the mismatched and ineffectual
financial supervision not only has no use in preventing crisis
but also may lead to even worse outcomes.
Key Words:Credit
Expansion; Supervisory Mismatch; Financial Crisis
JEL Classification:F30,G18
Allocation of
Power within a Firm: A Co-operative
Game Model
Lu Zhoulai
(Economic Research Center,China National
Defense University)
Abstract:The
theory of constructing the first-best contract, represented by
TCE (transaction cost economics) and GHM (Grossman-Hart-Moore),
doesn't solve the problem of source, allocation and
enforceability of power within the firm. Bargaining power in the
co-operative game model developed by Aoki isn’t endogenetic
Under the framework of co-operative game theory, we can educe
the conclusion below: The power within a real firm is the
outcome of bargaining between contractors, whose size of control
power is determined by his size of bargaining power. Only by
this, the power within a firm is not only existent but
auto-self-enforcing. And the size of bargaining power and thus
the control power within a firm is determined by the size of
substitutable and in inverse proportion to latter. Moreover, the
attitude to risk can affect bargaining power and thus the
allocation of power within a firm.
Key Words:Theory
of Firm;Allocation
of Power;Bargaining
Power;Co-operative
Game
JEL Classification:D230,L140,L200,M210
Background Risk
and Investors’ Participation in Risky Financial Assets
He Xingqiang, Shi Wei and Zhou Kaiguo
(Lingnan College, Sun Yatsen
University)
Abstract:Utilizing
an individual investor survey in 9 cities in China in 2006, this
paper studies the effect of labor income risk on investors’
participation in risky financial assets for the first time, and
explores the effects of background risks and a range of other
factors extensively. Results obtained include that labor income
risk, business investment, and real estate investment reduce
investors’ participation in risky financial assets. Health
status exerts insignificant effect, whereas medical social
security or commercial health insurance promotes investors’
participation. Risk aversion is statistically insignificant. Our
findings provide some policy implications.
Key Words:Background
Risk; Labor Income Risk; Health Status; Risky Financial Assets
JEL Classification:D8,G11,Z13
Prosocial
Behaviors and the Decomposition of Social Preferences
Chen Yefeng
(School of Economics,Zhejiang
University)
Abstract:Employing
a within-subjects design,in this paper we run a two-person
anonymous and absolutely strange matching quaternate experiments
with suvery questions.We found there are widely exsited with
four kinds of classic prosocial behaviors and we also detected a
significant relations between these different kinds of prosocial
behaviors in different games. Meanwhile we decomposed and tested
the social preferences behind the trust and trustworthiness
actions in the trust game and the cooperation actions in the
public goods game.We found that the variance in trust actions is
accounted for by expectation of trustworthiness but not
altruism,while variance in trustworthiness actions is mainly
accounted for by altruism with a comparatively small role of
reciprocity.And the pattern of cooperation behavior in public
goods game is consistent with inequality aversion.
Key Words:
Prosocial Behavior; Social Preferences; Experimental Economics;
Public Goods Game; Trust Game; Dictator Game
JEL Classification:C72,
C92, C81, D71
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